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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of economic freedom, regulations and bank governance on bank 
performance and risk-taking in 18 European countries for the period 2004–2016. To this end, we use 
the Fraser economic freedom index and its sub-components namely credit, labor and business market 
regulation. Our results reveal that economic freedom increases bank performance and contributes to 
financial stability and soundness. Moreover, we show that liberal credit, labor and business 
regulation improves the profitability of banks and reduces risk-taking. Regarding the bank 
governance variables, we find that a large board increases the probability of default whilst the results 
are mixed for bank performance. Also, we show that experienced directors are associated with less 
risk-taking and better bank performance. The impact of female directors is positive on bank 
performance. Regarding the risk-taking of banks, we find that, in a liberal environment, women lead 
to less credit risk. Finally, the compensation of directors increases bank performance and reduces 
risk-taking. Our findings change depending on the time period and the location. 
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1. Introduction 
Banks play a crucial role in the entire economy as they provide essential financial services and, 
hence, contribute to economic growth and development (Barth et al., 2006). Because of the 
importance of banks on economic activities it is not surprising that so much attention has been given 
on the regulation and supervision of the banking sector (Chortareas et al., 2013; Barth et al., 2006; 
Laeven and Levine, 2009). More precisely, banks should be regulated and supervised not only to 
protect investors and consumers but also to safeguard the soundness of the financial system (Barth et 
al., 2013; Chortareas et al., 2013).  
The global financial crisis revealed weaknesses concerning the regulatory framework of financial 
institutions and, thus, re-activated the debate of whether regulatory reforms can promote well-
functioning banking systems (Pasiouras et al., 2009; Sufian and Habibullah, 2010).  In this context 
many rules and recommendations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Basel II,III3, have 
been issued by regulators and policymakers to promote a more resilient banking sector and enable 
market participants to make better risk assessments (Chortareas et al., 2013; Barth et al., 2013). 
However, stricter regulation and direct control of banks by the government may have a negative 
impact on the economic growth by limiting the economic freedom (Sufian and Majid, 2011; 
Chortareas et al., 2013). Economic freedom is broadly defined as the freedom to prosper within a 
country without intervention from a government or economic authority.  
Economic freedom plays a vital role to the development of the banking system as it encourages the 
business environment and contributes to the development of innovative ideas. More precisely, 
greater economic freedom is likely to lead to a better environment for business and, thus, better 
economic growth and better banking performance (Sufian and Majid, 2011; Chortareas et al., 2013;  
Pasiouras et al., 2009). Despite the fact that the impact of economic freedom on the economy has 
been extensively studied (Bergh and Karlsson, 2010; Altman, 2008), its impact on the banking sector 
has attracted the interest of researchers only in recent years (Psillaki and Mamatzakis, 2017; Sufian 
and Majid, 2011; Sufian and Hassan, 2010; Sufian and Habibullah, 2010).  
The aim of this essay is to examine whether and to what extent economic freedom and regulation of 
credit, labor and business market affect bank performance and risk-taking. In order to investigate the 
impact of regulation on bank performance and bank stability, we use an assortment of information 
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such as the Fraser economic freedom index4 (Gwartney et al., 2017), as well as restrictions on credit, 
labor and business markets. To our knowledge, this essay constitutes the first attempt to consider the 
impact of economic freedom and credit, labor and business market regulation in combination with 
bank governance variables, both on bank performance and risk-taking. Using this approach we check 
for possible changes on the effects of corporate variables on bank performance and stability. 
Regulators who are concerned with the safety and soundness of the banks may apply additional 
pressure and legal responsibility on boards and, hence, may affect their impact on bank performance 
and stability (Barth et al., 2013; Pasiouras et al., 2009).   
Moreover, we take into consideration the two different theoretical perspectives that concern the 
effects of banking regulation; the "public interest view" and the "private interest view" (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998; Barth et al., 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2005). According to the "public interest view", 
it is believed that banking restrictions would be beneficial as they lead to smaller financial 
institutions which are easy to monitor. Moreover, when banks operate in a heavily strict 
environment, they have fewer opportunities to increase risk (Boyd et al., 1998; Barth et al., 2006). In 
contrast, the "private interest view" holds that there are many advantages when banks are permitted 
to engage in a broad range of activities (Sufian and Habibullah, 2014; Beach and Kane, 2008). A 
competitive banking system would limit the ability of regulators to extract bribes, would contribute 
to the efficient management of financial intermediaries and to the improvement of monetary policy 
transmission via the interbank market rate and, thus, to the economic growth (Claessens and Laeven, 
2004; Beck et al., 2003; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2008).  
Due to the lack of knowledge about the effects of adopting stricter regulation or having more 
economic freedom on banks, we address the following questions: 
 Does economic freedom lead to an increase in bank risk-taking? 
 Does economic freedom matter for bank performance? 
 Does credit market regulation affect bank stability and performance? 
 Does labor market regulation increase bank performance and decrease risk-taking? 
 Does business market regulation reduce bank risk-taking and improve bank performance? 
 Do the macroeconomic variables change the impact of bank governance variables on bank 
performance and risk-taking? 
 
                                                             
4
 The Fraser economic freedom index consists of size of government, legal structure and security of property rights, 
access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally and regulation of credit, labor and business sector (Gwartney et 
al., 2017). 
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In order to answer the above questions, we take into consideration our findings from the first essay. 
More precisely, we use bank governance variables which are considered as main variables of 
corporate governance (Pathan and Faff, 2013; Belhaj and Mateus, 2016) in conjunction with 
macroeconomic variables namely, economic freedom, regulation of credit, labor and business 
market, stock market capitalization and foreign bank assets, to check whether there is any 
differentiation in the impact of corporate governance variables on bank performance and risk-taking. 
Moreover, we control for country-level characteristics such as economic conditions taking into 
account the annual growth of GDP and the annual rates of inflation (Pasiouras, 2008; Maudos et al., 
2002; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2003).  
Moreover, using a sample of commercial banks from 18 different European countries for the period 
2004-2016, this essay provides new evidence to the existing literature by considering both developed 
and developing countries. Prior studies in the literature (Mamatzakis et al., 2013; Sufian and 
Habibullah, 2010; Sufian and Majid, 2011) analyzed the effect of economic freedom on bank 
efficiency focusing on Central and Eastern European countries (Psillaki and Mamatzakis, 2017; 
Mamatzakis et al., 2013; Wah Low et al., 2010; Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al., 2009b). Also, in order 
to check for any changes according to location we grouped countries in three separated groups 
according to their geographic location, such as South, North and Central Europe. Bank regulation 
differs from country to country as there is a difference in the freedom which permits banks to engage 
in a range of different activities (González, 2005). 
Finally, by analyzing the extent to which a major global shock, that is the recent financial crisis, may 
have altered regulation and restrictions on banks. More precisely, we investigate the period before, 
during and after the global financial crisis paying particular attention to the effects of regulatory 
reforms on bank performance and risk-taking. Due to the fact that today, the largest banks continue 
to face political and regulatory pressure, the need to rethink bank regulation is of particular 
importance. Especially, European banks are in a turning point as they face many challenges and also 
are forced to better understand and respond to the sources of pressure such as regulators and 
investors (Barth et al., 2013; Houston et al., 2010).   
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results and explores some extended analysis and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
This section presents the literature review and develops the hypotheses regarding the impact of 
economic freedom and regulations (credit, labor, business) on bank performance and risk-taking. 
2.1 Economic freedom, bank performance and risk-taking   
The results from previous empirical studies (Sufian and Habibullah, 2010; Wah Low et al., 2010; 
Sufian and Majid, 2011) regarding the impact of economic freedom on bank efficiency are mixed 
and hence, need to be further examined. Sufian and Hassan (2010) using a sample of five South East 
Asian countries for the period 1994-2008, find that economic freedom improves the environment 
associated with innovation and entrepreneurship, and, thus has a positive impact on economic 
development and bank performance. This means that when financial institutions operate in a less 
restricted environment they are more likely to engage in competitive policies and, hence, achieve 
higher levels of performance.  
Similarly, Sufian and Habibullah (2010) examining a sample of Malaysian banks from 1999 to 2007, 
show that economic freedom has a positive effect on bank profitability. One possible explanation for 
this result is that economic freedom allows banks to lead to foreign financial institutions and 
companies. In addition, Baier et al. (2012) analyzing bank data from different countries during the 
period 1976-2008 report that greater levels of economic freedom are associated with a lower 
probability of financial crises, thus suggesting that more freedom is conducive to a more stable 
financial system.  
Moreover, Sufian and Majid (2011) analyzing a sample of Islamic banks during the period 2000-
2008, provide evidence that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
economic freedom and bank performance. Economic freedom contributes to the promotion of a 
sound banking system which is vital for sustainable economic growth. Furthermore, authors support 
that countries with higher level of economic freedom are more likely to enjoy higher living 
standards. Their findings corroborate the research conducted by Holmes et al. (2008) who claim that 
a high level of economic freedom is associated with a high level of GDP per capita and, hence, this 
in turn may lead to a high demand for banking services.  
On the contrary, Wah Low et al. (2010) based on a sample of banks from six East Asian countries 
during the period 1975-2006 examine the impact of economic freedom on bank performance. Their 
results indicate that the economic freedom index has a positive and significant impact on bank 
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performance in Singapore but the effect is negative on the other countries. One possible explanation 
for this result is that Singapore is widely recognized as a highly open economy with a well developed 
banking system (Wah Low et al., 2010) and more economic freedom. 
In the same line, Demirguc Kunt et al. (2004) using data from 72 countries over the 1995-1999 
period find that better institutional framework, as captured by the index of economic freedom, 
decreases bank performance, measured by the net interest margin. A possible explanation is that in 
countries where the economic freedom is high, it tends to increase competition in the banking sector 
from other financial intermediaries such as hedge funds and private equity and, thus, have a negative 
impact on bank performance. 
Moreover, Ghosh (2016) employing bank data from MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 
countries during the period 2000-2012, shows that economic freedom has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on bank risk-taking measured by Z-Score and non-performing loans. According to 
the author, it is believed that more restrictions on banking activities and, therefore less economic 
freedom improve bank soundness and lead to less risk-taking.  
The above argument gives rise to following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.a (H1.a): Economic freedom is positively related with bank performance 
Hypothesis 1.b (H1.b): Economic freedom is negatively related with bank performance 
Hypothesis 1.c (H1.c): Economic freedom increases bank risk-taking 
Hypothesis 1.d (H1.d): Economic freedom reduces bank risk-taking 
2.2 Credit, labor and business market regulation, bank performance and risk-taking 
2.2.1 Credit market regulation, bank performance and risk-taking 
Credit market regulation index consists of three sub-components namely ownership of banks, private 
sector credit and interest rate controls (Gwartney et al., 2017). Credit regulation reflects the 
conditions in the domestic credit market. According to Barth et al. (2006) there are different views 
regarding the effects of banking regulation, namely the "public interest view" and the "private 
interest view". From the "private interest view" it is believed that regulatory restrictions on bank 
activities could reduce the franchise value of a bank and also impede the ability to diversify income 
streams and, hence, have a negative impact on bank efficiency and lead to greater instability (Laeven 
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and Levine, 2007;).  
Moreover, many economists (Barth et al., 2000; Haubrich and Santos, 2005; Claessens and Laeven, 
2004; Evanoff, 1998) believe that regulatory restrictions may be inefficient for banks. A possible 
explanation is that such restrictions on banking activities can limit the exploitation of economies of 
scale. Also, in the developing countries where state control of bank lending decisions tends to be 
higher than private control, it is likely to lead to lower bank performance. One possible explanation 
for this result is that banks lend more to less creditworthy companies. 
On the contrary, the "public interest view" supports that there are many theoretical reasons that 
advocate stricter regulations on bank activities. Firstly, it is believed that when banks are allowed to 
engage in a broader range of activities then it is more likely to have more opportunities to increase 
risk (Barth et al., 2006; Boyd et al., 1998; Saunders, 1994). Another reason for tighter regulations is 
that governments usually act in the interests of the public and regulate banks to ensure financial 
stability and ameliorate market failures.  
Claessens and Laeven (2004) examined the effects of entry and regulations on banking activities in 
50 countries for the period 1994-2000 and found that stricter restrictions on banking activities 
resulted in lower competition and, thus, in lower bank efficiency. This happens because competition 
in the banking sector is crucial for the quality of financial products, the degree of financial 
innovation and the efficient production of financial services (Claessens and Laeven, 2004). 
Furthermore, Chortareas et al. (2013) examining bank data from 27 European countries over the 
period 2001-2009, show that financial freedom has a positive and significant impact on bank 
efficiency. One possible explanation for this result is the fact that when banks operate in a less 
restricted environment it is likely to increase competition and to achieve higher levels of efficiency. 
Similarly, Barth et al. (2013) based on a sample of banks from 72 countries for the period 1999-2007 
find that tighter regulations reduce bank efficiency. Moreover, they indicate that greater 
independence of supervisory authority enhances bank efficiency level.  
In addition, Sufian and Habibullah (2010) studied the relationship between institutional environment 
and bank performance in Malaysia. Using data for commercial banks in Malaysia from 1999 to 2007, 
the authors report that financial freedom has a positive and significant impact on bank performance. 
This means that less control on banks by the government permits financial institutions to engage in 
banking activities that lead to economic growth and to financial stability (Boyd et al., 2004). 
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In the same vein, Mamatzakis et al. (2013) using the Fraser index in a sample of 10 Central and 
Eastern European countries during the period 2000-2010 provide evidence that certain aspects of 
credit regulation, such as interest rate controls have a negative and statistically significant impact on 
bank efficiency. This means that the limitations in the interest rate control can act as a barrier for 
banks to invest in high-risk and high-return projects (Jimenez et al., 2010). 
However, Laeven and Levine, 2005 claim that broad banking activities may lead to the formation of 
complex entities which are difficult to monitor. In addition, the "public interest view" supports that 
government can contribute to bank stability and protect the economy from the negative effects of 
bank failure, through effective screening on bank activities (Barth et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009b) analyzing a dataset of banks from 11 Central and 
Eastern European countries over the period 1998-2005 show that there is a positive relationship 
between profit efficiency and banking reform using the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) index of banking sector. Similarly, Delis et al. (2011) using a sample of 
commercial banks from 22 transition countries between 1999 and 2009 find that regulations which 
promote monitoring and restrictions on bank activities have a positive impact on bank productivity. 
This result is corroborated by González (2009) who claim that banks with stricter regulations reduce 
risk-taking in poorly developed financial markets and increase bank efficiency over the period 1996-
2002. 
Moreover, Agoraki et al. (2011) based on a sample of Central and Eastern European banks from 
1998-2005 support that increased regulation, through higher capital requirements and activity 
restrictions in combination with a higher level of market power reduce both credit risk and the risk of 
default. A possible explanation is that restrictions in banking activities increase the likelihood that 
banks would suffer during financial crises.  
The above argument gives rise to following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2.1.a (H2.1.a): Credit market regulation is positively related with bank performance 
Hypothesis 2.1.b (H2.1.b): Credit market regulation is negatively related with bank performance 
Hypothesis 2.1.c (H2.1.c): Credit market regulation increases bank risk-taking 
Hypothesis 2.1.d (H2.1.d): Credit market regulation reduces bank risk-taking 
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2.2.2 Labor market regulation, bank performance and risk-taking 
Labor market restriction index consists of hiring regulations and minimum wage, hiring and firing 
regulations, centralized collective bargaining, hours regulations, mandated cost of worker dismissal 
and conscription (Gwartney et al., 2017). The aim of labor market regulation is to protect employees 
from arbitrary actions on the part of the employers (Mamatzakis et al., 2013). According to Bertola 
(2009), factors such as limited wage setting flexibility and regulatory constraints on firing affect 
labor market dynamics. In many counties, labor market regulations are an important and 
controversial issue which constrains the ability of businesses to adjust employment levels.  
Several studies (Botero et al., 2004; Blanchard and Wolfers 2000; Besley and Burgess 2004; 
Scarpetta and Tressel, 2004) that relate the labor market regulations to economic outcomes, show 
that stricter labor regulations tend to decrease economic performance. However, little is known 
concerning the impact of labor market regulations on bank performance and risk-taking. Mamatzakis 
et al. (2013) based on a sample of 10 CEE countries during the period 2000-2010 find that there is a 
positive relationship between liberal labor regulation and bank performance. According to the 
author, liberal reforms in the labor market may decrease employee complacency and, hence, could 
lead to an increase in bank performance.  
In the same vein, Psillaki and Mamatzakis (2017) using data from 10 Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries for the period 2004 to 2009, show that labor market reforms have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on bank efficiency. This means that less regulatory restrictions are 
more likely to increase bank efficiency. One possible explanation for this result is that stricter 
employment protection legislation affects negatively firm returns and therefore, results in declining 
productivity growth (Scarpetta and Tressel, 2004; Besley and Burgess, 2004). 
On the contrary, other empirical studies claim that stricter labor regulation can increase bank 
performance. More precisely, Koutsomaloni-Filippaki and Mamatzakis (2013) using bank data from 
15 European countries during the period 2005-2010, report that there is a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between labor market regulations and bank efficiency. Their findings indicate 
that greater market liberalization would reduce bank efficiency.  
This is also consistent with the findings of Deakin and Sarkar (2008) who find that stricter labor 
regulations have a positive effect on productivity growth in France, Germany and in the United 
States from 1970 to 2000. In addition, labor market regulations that are linked to wage pressures 
could lead to higher labor productivity and to a reduction in bank risk due to the investment in 
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specific skills of employees and to intensive technology (Autor et al., 2007). 
The above argument gives rise to following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2.2.a (H2.2.a): Labor market regulation is positively related with bank performance 
Hypothesis 2.2.b (H2.2.b): Labor market regulation is negatively related with bank performance 
Hypothesis 2.2.c (H2.2.c): Labor market regulation increases linked to bank risk-taking 
Hypothesis 2.2.d (H2.2.d): Labor market regulation reduces linked to bank risk-taking 
2.3 Business market regulation, bank performance and risk-taking 
Business market regulation index comprises of administrative requirements, bureaucracy costs, 
regulation about starting a business, extra payments, licensing restrictions and cost of tax compliance 
(Gwartney et al., 2017). It refers to entry barriers and constrains that may reduce competition and, 
thus, may also affect bank performance. It is believed that regulatory entry barriers and bureaucratic 
procedures lead to a reduction in new firms entering in a business and hence, resulted in decreased 
competition (Klapper et al., 2006).  
Chortareas et al. (2013) supports that revenues generated by new businesses have a significant 
impact on bank profitability. For instance, business regulations and entry barriers can lead to 
decreased competition, reduced growth and less productivity (Klapper et al., 2006; Loayza et al., 
2005). This, in turn has a negative impact on bank performance as firms would not be able to fulfill 
their obligations to the banks.  
In this context, Sufian and Habibullah (2010) using a sample of Malaysian banks from 1999 to 2007, 
indicate that business freedom has a positive effect on bank profitability. Similarly, Psillaki and 
Mamatzakis (2017) based on a sample of 10 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries from 
2004 to 2009 find evidence that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
business regulations on bank efficiency. This means that less regulatory restrictions and entry 
barriers that concern new businesses are more likely to increase bank efficiency through increased 
competition and economic growth and development.  
However, using a stochastic frontier approach for cost efficiency, Sufian and Habibullah (2014) 
analyze a sample of commercial banks in Malaysia over the period 1995-2008 and find that there is a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between business freedom and bank efficiency. This 
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means that greater freedom to start, operate and close a business, tends to lower bank entry barriers, 
and hence, intensify competition and impede bank efficiency.  
Moreover, business market regulations may also affect bank risk. More precisely, increased business 
regulations may prompt informality, and, thus, making it harder for banks to assess the 
creditworthiness of a company (Loayza et al., 2005). This may lead to high levels of non-performing 
loans and to more credit risk for banks.  
Based on the existing literature our hypotheses are as following: 
Hypothesis 2.3.a (H2.3.a): Business market regulation is positively related with bank performance 
Hypothesis 2.3.b (H2.3.b): Business market regulation is negatively related with bank 
performance 
Hypothesis 2.3.c (H2.3.c): Business market regulation increases bank risk-taking 
Hypothesis 2.3.d (H2.3.d): Business market regulation reduces bank risk-taking 
2.4 The impact of global financial crisis (GFC) on bank performance and risk-taking 
The post-crisis agenda raised questions about regulation and its impact on bank performance and 
risk-taking. It was recognized that supervision prevents banks from engaging in risky behavior and 
therefore contribute to bank performance and stability. Shehzad and De Haan (2008) using a sample 
of developing and developed countries for the period 1981-2002 examine the impact of financial 
liberalization on systemic and non-systemic banking crises.5 Their results indicate that financial 
liberalization reduces the likelihood of systemic crises. Few years later, Barth et al. (2013) show that 
when banks suffer from banking crisis then stricter regulations would be beneficial as they result in a 
higher bank performance and in a more stable financial system. 
In the same vein, Baier et al. (2012) based on a sample from different countries during the period 
1976-2008 find that higher economic freedom is associated with lower probability of a banking 
crisis. Financial liberalization is considered to enhance financial development as banks can exploit 
opportunities from increased competition. Also, they report that credit market regulation increases 
after a financial crisis. A possible explanation for this result is that in the post-crisis period there is a 
diminution in economic freedom and its components that stems from tighter regulation and slower 
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 Systemic banking crisis is a crisis in which more or all bank capitals have been exhausted (Caprio and Klingebiel, 
1999). Non-systemic crisis is of lesser significance in which large banks fail.  
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economic growth. Similarly, De Haan et al. (2009) analyze the effects of crises on economic 
freedom in Norway and Sweden for 1985-2005 and find that economic freedom falls right after a 
crisis but then increases. 
However, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) using data from different countries over the period 2007-2008 
provide evidence that stricter regulation on banking activities resulted in banks performing better 
during the crisis. Authors believe that traditional bank activities are less exposed to the risks that turn 
out poorly during the crisis and also support that financial liberalization induces risk-taking behavior 
and may contribute to banking crises, and hence, to financial instability. 
Hypothesis 3.a (H3.a): Compared to ‘normal times’, the predicted relation between economic 
freedom, regulation of credit, labor, business market and bank performance varies following the 
financial crisis. 
Hypothesis 3.b (H3.b): Compared to ‘normal times’, the predicted relation between economic 
freedom, regulation of credit, labor, business market and risk-taking is less pronounced following 
the financial crisis. 
3. Data and methodology 
In this section we analyze the bank sample and the data sources. Furthermore, we describe in detail 
the variables used in the regression equations and, finally, we present the methodology. 
3.1 Sample and Data  
The balance-sheet and income statement data used in this study was extracted from the Bankscope 
database while the macroeconomic data was extracted from the 2017 version of the Fraser Index of 
Economic Freedom and the Word Bank database for the period 2004 to 2016. The research 
comprises samples of 75 commercial European banks from 18 European countries namely Spain, 
Italy, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Portugal, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Poland, Greece, Sweden and Finland. Moreover, after scrutinizing the data 
to avoid inconsistencies, errors, and double counting of institutions we end up with an unbalanced 
panel of 861 bank-year observations. 
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3.2 Variables  
In this sub-section we describe in detail the set of variables considered in our study namely, the 
dependent variables, the main explanatory variables and the control variables. 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
In line with previous studies (Belhaj and Mateus, 2016; Pathan and Faff 2013; Andres and Vallelado 
2008; Setiyono and Tarazi 2014), we employ alternative proxies of bank performance (PERFOR) 
and risk-taking (RISK) that are commonly used in the existing literature as they provide us with 
different types of information on governance, the multiple proxies of performance and risk. Finally, 
we will check the robustness of our findings using these different proxies of bank performance and 
risk. These are, return on average assets (ROAA), return on average equity (ROAE), net interest 
margin (NIM) and Tobin'sQ ratio for bank performance, Z-Score, non-performing loans (NPL) and 
Tier1-capital ratio for risk-taking.  .  
Return on average assets (ROAA) is an accounting-based measure of bank profitability. It is the net 
income after taxes, as a percentage of total assets (Pathan and Faff, 2013; Andrés and Vallelado, 
2008). Return on average assets (ROAA) reflects the capability of a bank to generate profits from its 
asset management functions. Moreover, it is used as the key ratio for the evaluation of bank 
performance in the existing literature (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 
2016). Return on average equity (ROAE) is the net income after taxes as a percentage of equity 
(Aebi et al., 2012). It is a direct measure of returns to shareholders and is influenced by the capital 
structure of a financial institution. Banks with higher leverage, and hence, lower equity, generally 
record lower percentage of return on average assets (ROAA) but higher percentage of return on 
average equity (ROAE). Moreover, return on average equity (ROAE) explains how effectively 
shareholder’s funds are being used by the management of the bank. 
Net interest margin (NIM) is the net interest income as a percentage of the average profit (Pathan and 
Faff, 2013). It is important to bank managers because it indicates whether asset and liability 
management is being done properly, meaning that the bank earns income on its assets and has low 
cost on its liabilities (Raharjo et al., 2014; Marinković and Radović, 2014). Tobin'sQ is the sum of 
the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities divided by the carrying amount of total 
assets (Pathan and Faff, 2013). Several studies have used this efficiency measure as a dependent 
variable in the banking sector (Belhaj and Mateus, 2016; Staikouras et al, 2007). Its importance 
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derives from the fact that it records the value of future investment opportunities. Therefore, a high 
value of this index means that a bank has high growth potential.  
The first measure of bank risk is Z-Score. It is used in bank governance literature (Bai and Elyasiani, 
2013; Delis et al., 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Laeven and Levine, 2009) referring to the 
relationship between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance and other regulatory 
policies. It is defined as the mean of ( OA) + AR/σ ( OA) where ROA is the return on assets and 
CAR is the capital-asset ratio. Hence, Z-Score can be defined as a measure of the distance to default 
(Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). A lower value of Z-Score indicates higher bank risk.  
Non-performing loans (NPL) is used as a proxy for credit risk and financial stability. It is the ratio of 
loans loss provisions divided by total loans (Pathan et al., 2008). According to the European Central 
Bank (ECB, 2017), it is a credit risk measure that directly affects the profitability of banks and, 
hence, financial stability. A high percentage of this proxy means that there is an increase on credit 
portfolio which could spillover and affects the stability of the financial system (ECB, 2017). 
Finally, the Tier 1 capital ratio6 is the ratio of a bank's core equity capital to its total risk-weighted 
assets (RWA). Risk-weighted assets are the total of all assets held by the bank weighted by credit 
risk according to a formula determined by the Basel rules (BCBS, 2010). It is a key measure of a 
bank's financial strength. 
3.2.2 The Fraser Index of Economic Freedom indicators 
According to Gwartney et al. (2017) the Fraser economic freedom index measures the degree to 
which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom. A country has to 
provide secure protection of privately owned property and a stable monetary environment in order to 
receive a high economic freedom index. Moreover, it should have low levels of taxes, refrain from 
creating barriers to both domestic and international trade and rely more on markets than government 
(Gwartney et al., 2017; Pasiouras et al., 2009). Each component of economic freedom is placed on a 
scale from 0 for no freedom to 10 for maximum freedom.  
The credit market regulation (CR-REG) component consists of the following sub-components: i) 
ownership of banks (CR-OWN), ii) private sector credit (CR-PR) and iii) interest rate controls (CR-
IR). The sub-component ownership of banks (CR-OWN) measured as the percentage of deposits 
                                                             
6
 Tier1 capital increases from 4%in Basel II to 6% applicable in 2015. This 6% is composed of 4.5% of CET1, plus an 
extra 1.5% of additional Tier1. 
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held in private owned banks. The other two sub-components, namely private sector credit (CR-PR) 
and interest rate controls (CR-IR), indicate the extent to which credit is supplied to the private sector 
and whether controls on interest rates interfere with the market in credit (Gwartney et al., 2017). 
Higher levels of the credit regulation index denote less regulatory restriction. 
However, we also consider the other two sub-components of regulation, namely labor market 
regulations and business regulation to examine their impact on bank performance and risk-taking. 
Labor market regulation (LB-REG) component, is designed to measure the extent to which these 
restraints upon economic freedom are present.  In order to earn high marks in the component rating 
regulation of the labor market, a country must allow market forces to determine wages and establish 
the conditions of hiring and firing, and refrain from the use of conscription (Gwartney et al., 2017). 
Finally, the business regulation (BS-REG) component presents the extent to which regulations and 
bureaucratic procedures restrain entry and reduce competition. In order to earn high score in this 
component, countries have to allow markets to determine prices and refrain from regulatory 
activities that retard entry into business and increase the cost of production. Moreover, they must 
refrain from using their power to extract financial payments and reward businesses at the expense of 
others (Gwartney et al., 2017). 
3.2.3 Control variables 
We use a number of bank-specific and country-specific variables. To begin with bank-specific 
variables, bank size (LNTA), is defined as the natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets (Psillaki 
and Mamatzakis, 2017; Barth et al., 2013; Chortareas et al., 2013). Secondly, we employ the level of 
capitalization variable which is defined as the equity of total assets (CAPITAL) and it is used as a 
proxy for capital adequacy or capital risk (Chortareas et al., 2013; Belhaj and Mateus, 2016; Pathan 
and Faff, 2013). The next variable refers to the ratio of loans to total assets (LOANSTA) used as a 
proxy for asset utilization (Psillaki and Mamatzakis, 2017; Pasiouras, 2006; Mamatzakis et al., 
2013). It is a measure of loan activity and it is expected to be positive as it is associated with well-
functioning intermediation by financial institutions (Mamatzakis et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, in order to account for macroeconomic conditions within each country, we employ the 
following variables. Firstly, we use the GDP growth (GDP) which equals the rate of real per capita 
GDP growth and it is considered as a proxy for the fluctuations in economic activities (Agoraki et 
al., 2011; Mamatzakis et al., 2013). GDP growth is commonly used as an indicator of the monetary 
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environment. Inflation (INF) equals the annual rate of the change in the Consumer Price Index7  
2010 (CPI). It is believed that underdeveloped countries are linked to high levels of inflation (Boyd 
et al., 2001).  
Another variable is the stock market capitalization to GDP (MACGDP) used as a proxy for the size 
of the stock market (Beck et al, 2003; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000; Pasiouras, 2008). Despite 
the fact that previous studies in the literature (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 1999; Bart et al, 2006, 
Pasiouras et al., 2009) employed this indicator, their results still remain mixed.  Moreover, to capture 
for the impact of the presence of foreign banks we use the percentage of foreign bank assets among 
total assets (FOREIGN) as a proxy for market structure (Psillaki and Mamatzakis, 2013; Pasiouras et 
al., 2009; Weill, 2003). 
Finally, we employ some bank governance variables as explanatory variables. We use those that 
have the most significant impact on both bank performance and risk-taking in accordance with our 
findings in the first essay. More precisely, we use board size (BS), gender diversity (FEMALE), 
board financial experience (EXPER) and compensation (COMPENSATION). 
According to Pathan and Faff (2013), Staikouras et al. (2007), board size (BS) is defined as the sum 
of the directors within a board (executive and supervisory). Financial experience (EXPER) is the 
average number of financial experience relevant either on the supervisory or executive board on 
which the director sits (Fernandes and Fich, 2013). The percentage of female directors (FEMALE) is 
defined as the percentage of women on the board (Owen and Temesvary, 2018). Finally, according 
to BoardEx definitions, compensation (COMPENSATION) is the sum of salary and bonus. 
3.4 Empirical models and methodology 
3.4.1 Fixed-Effects model 
Our sample is a mixture of time series and cross-sectional analysis and as a consequence the most 
efficient tool to use is panel data analysis (Andres and Vallelado, 2008). The advantage of this 
method is that it takes into account the heterogeneity, which is the specific characteristics of each 
bank, such as the quality of management, business activity among others (Belhaj and Mateus, 2016). 
The first econometric method we apply to control the impact of bank governance variables on bank 
performance and risk-taking is Fixed-Effects.8 When the unobserved effect is correlated with 
                                                             
7
 Basis year is the 2010. 
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independent variables, then this method gives unbiased estimators in contrast with Pooled OLS 
method which produces biased and inconsistent estimators.  
Bank performance model 
(PERFOR) i, t = β
0
 + β
1
EC-FR i,t + β
2
CR-REG i, t + β
3
LB-REG i, t + β
4
BS-REG i, t + β
5
LNTA i, 
t+β
6
CAPITALi,+β
7
LOANSTAi,t+β
8
GDPi,t+β
9
INFi,t+β
10
MACGDPi,t+β
11
FOREIGNi,t+β
12
BSi,t+β
13
EXPERi,t+β
14
FEMALEi,t+β
15
COMPENSATIONi, + ui + εi,t (1a) 
Bank risk model 
(RISK) i, t = β
0
 + β
1
EC-FR i t + β
2
CR-REG i, t + β
3
LB-REG i, t + β
4
BS-REG i, t + β
5
LNTA i, t+ 
β
6
CAPITALi,t+β
7
LOANSTAi,t+β
8
GDPi,t+β
9
INFi,t+β
10
MACGDPi,t+β
11
FOREIGNi,t+β
12
BSi,t+β
13
E
XPERi,t+β
14
FEMALEi,t+β
15
COMPENSATIONi, + ui + εi,t (1b) 
Where PERFOR and RISK denote performance and risk-taking respectively for bank i, t the time 
period, ln the natural logarithmic, β the parameters to be estimated, u the unobserved fixed-effect for 
bank i and ε the remaining disturbance term.  
3.4.2 Endogeneity issues and Two-step system GMM model 
To address the endogeneity problem in corporate governance literature, we use the two-step system 
estimator approach, proposed by Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This 
estimator involves the use of dynamic effect by adding a lagged dependent variable to the 
explanatory variable. Moreover, by applying the two-step system GMM, we can build instruments 
for endogenous variables. More precisely, to treat all potentially endogenous variables, we use their 
past values as their respective instruments (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013).  
To test the validity of the multiple lags as an instrument, we calculate the Hansen/Sargan test (Pathan 
and Faff, 2013; Andres and Vallelado, 2008). The AR(1) and AR(2) measure first and second degree 
serial correlation. The residuals of the first differences AR(1) may be correlated but there should be 
no correlation in the second differences AR(2) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
8
 Applying Hausman Test (Wooldridge, 2012) we conclude that the methodology to be used is Fixed Effects. 
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Bank performance model 
(PERFOR) i, t = β
0
 + β1PERFOR i, (t-1) + β2EC-FR i,t +β3CR-REG i,t+β4LB-REG i,t+ β5BS-
REGi,t+β
6
LNTAi,t+β
7
CAPITALi,t+β
8
LOANSTAi,t+β
9
GDPi,t+β
10
INFi,t+β
11
MACGDPi,t+β
12
FOREI
GNi,t+β
13
BSi,t+β
14
EXPERi,t+β
15
FEMALEi,t+β
16
COMPENSATIONi, + ui + εi,t (2a) 
Bank risk model 
(RISK) i, t = β
0
 + β1RISK i, (t-1) + β2EC-FR i, t + β3CR-REG i, t + β4LB-REG i, t + β5BS-REG i, t + 
β
6
LNTAi,t+β
7
CAPITALi,t+β
8
LOANSTAi,t+β
9
GDPi,t+β
10
INFi,t+β
11
MACGDPi,t+β
12
FOREIGNi,t+β
1
3
BSi,t+β
14
EXPERi,t+β
15
FEMALEi,t+β
16
COMPENSATIONi, + ui + εi,t (2b) 
Where PERFOR and RISK denote performance and risk-taking respectively for bank i, t the time 
period, ln the natural logarithmic, β the parameters to be estimated, u the unobserved fixed-effect for 
bank i and ε the remaining disturbance term.  
Table 1 summarizes the definitions of the variables used in this study. More precisely, the first group 
concerns the dependent variables which are bank performance and bank risk. Moving to the second 
group, Table 1 represents the definitions of Fraser Index of Economic Freedom Indicators which are 
economic freedom, credit regulation, labor regulation, business regulation. Moreover, the third 
group, Table 1 below, provides the definitions of control variables (bank size, capital ratio, loans to 
total assets, GDP, inflation, stock market capitalization to GDP, presence of foreign banks, board 
size, financial experience, the percentage of female directors and compensation). Finally, except for 
the definitions of variables, Table 1 also presents the Databases which we used to extract the data.   
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Table 1: Definition of variables 
  Variables                              Definition                                                                                                                                                 Database  
 Panel A: Dependent Variables   
Tobin’sQ Tobin’sQ The sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities divided by the carrying amount of total assets                              BankScope 
ROAA Return on average assets The net income after taxes, as a percentage of total assets                                                                                                                             BankScope  
ROAE Return on average equity The net income after taxes as a percentage of equity                                                                                                                                      BankScope  
NIM Net interest margin The net interest income as a percentage of average earning assets.                                                                                                                BankScope 
Z-Score Z-Score ratio The ratio of: mean( OAA)+ AR / st.dev ( OAA)                                                                                                                                        BankScope                     
NPL Non-performing loans     The ratio of loans loss provisions divided by total loans                                                                                                                                BankScope                     
Tier1-capital ratio Tier1-capital ratio The shareholder funds plus perpetual noncumulative preference shares as a percentage of risk weighted assets and off balance sheet  
risks measured under the Basel rules.                                                                                                                                                              BankScope                     
 Panel B: The Fraser Index of Economic Freedom Indicators   
   EC-FR Economic Freedom It measures the degree to which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom. The cornerstones of economic freedom are 
personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to enter markets and compete, and security of the person and privately owned property. It measures the degree 
of economic freedom in five broad areas namely, size of government, property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade international and regulation of 
credit, labor and business market. This variable takes values between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating greater economic freedom.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      The 2017 version of  
                                                                                                                                                                                             the Fraser index of Economic Freedom 
CR-REG Credit Regulation    It reflects conditions in the domestic credit market. This variable takes values between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating greater credit freedom. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             The 2017 version of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 the Fraser index of Economic Freedom    
LB-REG Labor Regulation It measures the extent to which these restraints upon economic freedom are present. In order to earn high marks in the component rating regulation of the labor 
market, a country must allow market forces to determine wages and establish the conditions of hiring and firing, and refrain from the use of conscription. 
This variable takes values between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating greater labor freedom.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      The 2017 version of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               the Fraser index of Economic Freedom 
BS-REG Business Regulation It identifies the extent to which regulations and bureaucratic procedures restrain entry and reduce competition.  This variable takes values between 0 and 10 
with higher values indicating greater business freedom.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          The 2017 version of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                the Fraser index of Economic Freedom 
CR-OWN Ownership of banks This sub-component measures the percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned banks. Countries with larger shares of privately held deposits received 
higher ratings. When privately held deposits between 95% and 100%, countries were given a rating of 10. When private deposits constituted between 75% and 
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95% of the total, a rating of 8 was assigned. When private deposits were between 40% and 75% of the total, the rating was 5. When private deposits are 
between 10% and 40%, countries received a rating of 2. A zero rating was assigned when private deposits were 10% or less of the total. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          The 2017 version of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                the Fraser index of Economic Freedom 
CR-PR Private sector credit This sub-component measures the extent to which government borrowing crowds out private borrowing. When data are available, this sub-component is 
calculated as the government fiscal deficit as a share of gross saving. Higher values are indicative of greater credit freedom.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          The 2017 version of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                the Fraser index of Economic Freedom 
CR-IR Interest rate controls Data on credit-market controls and regulations were used to construct rating intervals. Countries with interest rates determined by the market, stable monetary 
policy, and positive real deposit and lending rates received higher ratings. When interest rates were determined primarily by market forces and the real rates 
were positive, countries were given a rating of 10. A zero rating was assigned when the deposit and lending rates were fixed by the government and real rates 
were persistently negative by double-digit amounts or hyperinflation had virtually eliminated the credit market.                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       The 2017 version of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                the Fraser index of Economic Freedom 
 Panel C: Control Variables   
LNTA Bank size The natural logarithm  of total assets                                                                                                                                                                   BankScope 
CAPITAL Capital adequacy ratio The ratio of equity to total assets                                                                                                                                                                          BankScope 
LOANSTA Leverage ratio The ratio of loans to total assets                                                                                                                                                                           BankScope 
GDP GDP growth The rate of real per capita GDP growth.                                                                                                                                                              World Bank               
INF Inflation Annual rate of inflation.                                                                                                                                                                                       World Bank               
MACGDP  Stock market capitalization 
 to GDP 
The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. The variable serves as a proxy of ﬁnancial development.                                                      World Bank              
FOREIGN Presence of foreign banks Percentage of the total banking assets that are held by foreign banks. A foreign bank is a bank where 50 percent or more of its shares are owned by foreigners. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             World Bank                
COMPENSATION  (in 000s) Compensation The sum of salary and bonus                                                                                                                                                                                  BoardEx                  
FEMALE Female directors The percentage of directors on the board who are female                                                                                                                                      BoardEx 
BS Board size The number of directors sitting on the board                                                                                                                                                          BoardEx 
EXPER Financial experience The average number of financial experience relevant either on the supervisory or executive board on which the director sits.                          BoardEx 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and Correlation matrix  
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics on dependent variables, independent variables and control 
variables for the sample of European banks from 2004 to 2016. More precisely, panel A presents 
descriptive statistics of bank risk-taking and performance measures. The average Tobin'sQ fluctuates 
between 0.04% and 1.63%. Also the sample mean return on average assets (ROAA) is 0.64%. Our 
findings are in line with Belhaj and Mateus (2016) and Staikouras et al. (2007) who find that 
Tobin'sQ average is 1.03% and the mean return on assets (ROA)  is 0.75% using a sample of 58 
European banks. The average return on average equity (ROAE) is 7.89% while for net interest 
income (NIM) the mean is 1.72%. In the same direction, Belhaj and Mateus (2016) find an average 
return on equity ROE of 9.7% over the period 2002-2011. As the sample includes the crisis period 
we observe some negative values for our performance measures. 
Regarding risk measures, we see in Table 2 that the average Z-Score is 10.11. This means that many 
banks face a default risk (Levine, 2004) as a higher Z-Score indicates that a bank has higher returns 
to cover its liabilities. The mean ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) is 6.91% with a maximum 
value of 44.86%. The mean of Tier1-capital ratio is 11.11% with a minimum value of 4.20%.  
The variables in Panel B of Table 2 show that the average of economic freedom (EC-FR) is 7.49 
with a minimum of 6.43 and a maximum of 8.30. Regarding the variable credit regulation, Table 2 
demonstrates that credit regulation has an average 8.97 with a minimum of 6.00 and a maximum of 
10.00.  Moreover, the component of labor regulations has a mean of 6.43. The average of business 
regulation is 7.14 with a minimum value of 4.77 and a maximum value of 8.57. Our results 
corroborate those of Mamatzakis et al. (2013) who examined the impact of regulation on bank 
efficiency in Central and Eastern European countries during the period 2000-2010 and show that 
credit regulations are more established compared to the reforms of the labor and business market 
regulation.   
Panel C of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the control variables considered in our study. 
The banks in our sample have an average asset size of €7.32 billion. We use the natural logarithm of 
total assets in order to eliminate the effect of outliers on our results. The average of capital adequacy 
ratio reaches 13.92% while the minimum value is 4.10%. Our results are close to Belhaj and Mateus 
(2016) who find that the average equity to asset ratio (capital ratio) for European banks over the 
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period 2002-2011, is 11.62%. Banks are highly leveraged; the mean ratio of leverage is 12.63% 
while the maximum value is 89.06%.  Moreover, the mean of GDP growth is 0.99% while the 
average of inflation is 1.83%. Regarding the stock market capitalization to GDP we find that the 
minimum value is 9.06% and the maximum value is 57.17%.  The mean concerning the presence of 
foreign banks is 23.54% with a minimum value of 0% and a maximum value of 90%. According to 
Agoraki et al. (2011) a high presence of foreign banks contributes to more benefits for banks and to 
less risk-taking (Demirguc-Kunt and Serve, 2009).  
The bank governance variables in Panel C of Table 2 show that the average board size (BS) is 16.44 
with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 34 directors. Our results are close to Fernandes et al. (2017) 
who find that the average number of the board of directors is 16.39 for European banks over the 
period 2007-2008. Similarly, the results of Belhaj and Mateus (2016) show that during the period 
2002-2011 European banks have an average number of board members of 15.87. According to Booth 
et al. (2002) the number of directors in banks is usually larger than the one in non-financial firms. A 
large board in banks can be explained by many factors, such as the large size of banks.  Also, Table 2 
reports that bank directors have on average 5.77 years of bank experience with a minimum of one 
year and a maximum of 19.45 years. The mean percentage of female directors is 13.36% with a 
minimum value of 0% and a maximum value of 54.45%. In addition, the mean salary plus bonus 
(total compensation) for the directors is €4.45 million. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (2004-2016) All Countries 
    
     Variables 
 
Observations 
   
    Mean 
  
SD 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Panel A: Dependent Variables  
  Tobin’sQ (%) 645 1.02 0.15 0.04 1.63 
  ROAA (%) 809  0.64 1.17 -12.36 6.23 
  ROAE (%) 807 7.89 13.84 -48.01 51.46 
  NIM (%) 809 1.72 1.10 -1.60 10.27 
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  Z-SCORE (%) 739 10.11 6.55 -3.05 41.14 
  NPL (%) 767 6.91 6.59 0.17 44.86 
  TIER1-CAPITAL 
(%) 
714 11.11 4.61 4.20 69.25 
Panel B: The Fraser Index of Economic Freedom Indicators  
  EC-FR 861 7.49 0.30 6.43 8.30 
  CR-REG 861 8.97 0.81 6.00 10.00 
  LB-REG 861 6.43 1.21 3.68 8.46 
 BS-REG  860 7.14 0.86 4.77 8.57 
Panel C: Control Variables  
  LNTA (in €bil.) 811 7.32 1.98 2.59 11.76 
  CAPITAL (%) 727 13.92 4.67 4.10 68.36 
  LOANSTA (%) 807 12.63 16.2 24.02 89.06 
  GDP (%) 821 0.99 2.97 -9.13 25.55 
  INF (%) 821 1.83 1.27 -4.47 7.95 
  MACGDP (%) 790 49.10 29.30 9.06 57.17 
  FOREIGN (%) 720 21.55 23.54 0 90 
  BS (No) 861 16.44 5.89 2.00 34.00 
  EXPER (%) 861 5.77 2.76 1.00 19.45 
  FEMALE (%) 860 13.36 11.68 0.00 54.54 
  COMPENSATION   850 4.45 6.03 1.30 11.46 
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(in €mil.) 
Note: This table presents the distribution of each variable by showing mean, standard deviation, minimum (min) and 
maximum (max) value. 
 
 
Table 3 presents Pearson pair-wise sample correlations between variables. Multicollinearity among 
the regressors is not a serious concern since the maximum sample correlation is just 0.50 between 
Tier1-capital and Z-Score (Gujarati, 2004).  
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
Variables           1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 EC-FR 1.00                      
2 CR-REG 0.21* 1.00                     
3 LB-REG 0.33*      0.30*  1.00                    
4 BS-REG 0.32*      0.20*   0.38*  1.00                   
5 INF -0.14        -0.07 -0.08*   -0.13*     1.00                  
6 GDP 0.12       0.10* 0.11    0.09* 0.29* 1.00                 
7 LNTA 0.11* 0.16 0.15* 0.12* 0.17      0.16   1.00                
8 CAPITAL  0.19    0.17  0.21     0.25    -0.13*          0.10 -0.22* 1.00               
9 LOANSTA -0.18     -0.16 -0.14    -0.22 0.11     -0.09* -0.07*      0.12* 1.00              
10 MACGDP 0.12  -0.15     0.11 0.26* 0.09      0.30    0.16*  -0.22*  0.16 1.00             
11 FOREIGN -0.14*   0.09 0.15     -0.08 0.12*        0.09* -0.15*   0.21* -.0.15 -0.14* 1.00            
12 BS -0.11*  -0.18* -0.30 -0.27* -0.21    -0.06 0.13*  -0.22* 0.12 -0.24* 0.06 1.00           
13 EXPER -0.17*  0.14 -0.07     0.12 0.07     -0.09* 0.14*  -0.26*  0.19* 0.17 0.07 -0.01 1.00          
14 FEMALE 0.18*  0.11*   0.29* 0.30* -0.29      0.08* 0.27*  0.17* 0.12 0.18* -0.19* 0.24* 0.07* 1.00         
15 COMPENSATION 0.32* -0.12   0.17*      0.15 0.08*      0.12* 0.48* 0.02 0.14 0.30 -0.14 0.057 -0.10* 0.24* 1.00        
16 TOBIN’SQ 0.17*  0.08   0.16 0.08 -0.07     0.24*  -0.18*  0.10* 0.21* 0.14* -0.07 -0.26* -0.01 0.03 0.07 1.00       
17 NPL -0.35* -0.19 -0.12 -0.20* -0.26    -0.19*  -0.13*   0.11* 0.14* -0.38* 0.09 -0.09* -0.03  0.08* 0.14* 0.11* 1.00      
18 ROAA 0.12*  0.24* 0.15* 0.18* -0.10     0.32*       0.09* 0.14* -0.06 0.15     0.19 -0.08* 0.12* -0.07 0.001 0.33*  -0.29* 1.00     
19 ROAE 0.17*  0.21* 0.08* 0.09* -0.09   0.23  0.01 0.15 -0.08* 0.26* 0.18      -0.01 0.07* -0.01 0.03 0.13*  -0.12* 0.39* 1.00    
20 NIM -0.23*       0.18 -0.09* -0.33* 0.12    -0.06   -0.23* -0.05 0.19   -0.24    0.25*      -0.02    0.23* -0.04     0.09* 0.19*  0.27* 0.24* 0.07* 1.00   
21 Z-SCORE 0.25*  0.15     0.32      0.27* -0.14      0.17* 0.10*  0.38* 0.12  0.34* -0.12*  -0.31*    0.068 0.32* 0.21* 0.19*  -0.19* 0.25* 0.21*    -0.045 1.00  
22 TIER1-CAPITAL 0.08* 0.09    0.21* 0.24     -0.17*   -0.16 -0.13*  0.22* -0.28* -0.06 0.08  -0.25*   -0.014   -0.024 -0.03 0.09* 0.12 0.15* 0.07 -0.012 0.50* 1.00 
Note: The table reports Pearson Correlation Matrix. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.2 Descriptive statistics per country and per year 
Tables 4a and 4b present the average value of Frazer Index of Economic Freedom Indicators 
(economic freedom, credit regulations, labor regulations, market regulations) per country and per 
year respectively. Regarding the analysis of the countries (Table 4a) we notice that the average size 
of economic freedom varies between 6.96 in Greece and 8.05 in the UK. Greece and Poland have the 
lowest value of economic freedom with an average of 6.96 and 7.11 respectively, while Ireland and 
the UK have the highest value of economic freedom with an average of 8.01 and 8.05 
correspondingly. This means that developed countries are more liberal than developing ones, as they 
record higher value on the index of economic freedom.  
As far as the credit regulation is concerned, it varies from 7.84 to 9.92. At the country level the best 
performers in terms of credit regulation (CR-REG) are Spain (9.92) and Denmark (9.84) while the 
worst is Greece (7.84). Regarding labor regulation (LB-REG) the most liberalized labor markets are 
the UK (8.25) and Sweden (7.96) while Greece (4.46) and Germany (4.61) are the countries with the 
most rigid labor regulation. Moreover, business regulation (BS-REG) is significantly more liberal in 
Sweden (8.19) while Italy (5.87) and the Czech Republic (6.03) represent the countries with the most 
strict business regulation (BS-REG).  
Continuing with the per year analysis (Table 4b), we notice that in 2004 the mean of economic 
freedom was 7.58 and remained at the same level during the crisis with an average of 7.40. 
Regarding the credit regulation (CR-REG), Table 4b reports that there is a slight increase as from 
9.06 in 2004 it reached 9.14 in 2016 while freedom from labor regulation (LB-REG) has increased 
from 5.79 to 7.03 over the same period. Similarly, business regulation has improved from 7.29 in 
2004 to 7.71 in 2016.  Our results corroborate the research conducted by Mamatzakis et al. (2013) 
who found that credit, labor and business regulation improved during the period 2000-2010 in the 
Central and Eastern European countries.  
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Table 4a: Descriptive statistics per country  
 
Countries 
Variables 
EC-FR CR-REG LB-REG BS-REG 
 
Austria 
 
7.66 
 
9.25 
 
5.99 
 
7.28 
 
Poland 
 
7.11 
 
8.50 
 
5.41 
 
6.03 
 
Czech Republic 
 
7.35 
 
9.53 
 
7.88 
 
5.93 
 
Hungary 
 
7.28 
 
9.61 
 
9.86 
 
6.40 
 
Luxembourg 
 
7.54 
 
9.00 
 
9.63 
 
7.65 
 
Belgium 
 
7.39 
 
9.52 
 
7.10 
 
7.13 
 
Germany 
 
7.62 
 
8.06 
 
4.61 
 
7.38 
 
Netherlands 
 
7.60 
 
9.41 
 
4.72 
 
7.36 
 
France 
 
7.34 
 
9.36 
 
5.65 
 
7.13 
 
Ireland 
 
8.01 
 
8.60 
 
7.70 
 
7.84 
 
UK 
 
8.05 
 
8.64 
 
8.25 
 
7.76 
 
Denmark 
 
7.77 
 
9.84 
 
7.40 
 
8.05 
 
Sweden 
 
7.48 
 
9.27 
 
7.96 
 
8.19 
 
Finland 
 
7.76 
 
9.71 
 
5.36 
 
8.13 
 
Portugal 
 
7.29 
 
7.86 
 
5.39 
 
6.53 
 
Spain 
 
7.45 
 
9.92 
 
5.81 
 
7.67 
 
Greece 
 
6.96 
 
7.84 
 
4.46 
 
6.19 
 
Italy 
 
7.20 
 
8.94 
 
6.46 
 
5.87 
Note: This table reports the mean value in each country for economic freedom and regulation variables. 
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Table 4b: Descriptive statistics per year 
 
Year Variables 
EC-FR CR-REG LB-REG BS-REG 
 
2004 
 
7.58 
 
9.06 
 
5.79 
 
7.29 
 
2005 
 
7.61 
 
9.06 
 
6.05 
 
7.16 
 
2006 
 
7.57 
 
9.11 
 
6.08 
 
6.73 
 
2007 
 
7.53 
 
9.03 
 
6.04 
 
6.61 
 
2008 
 
7.43 
 
9.06 
 
6.10 
 
6.61 
 
2009 
 
7.39 
 
9.00 
 
6.49 
 
6.64 
 
2010 
 
7.41 
 
8.57 
 
6.54 
 
7.31 
 
2011 
 
7.46 
 
8.84 
 
6.75 
 
7.38 
 
2012 
 
7.43 
 
8.85 
 
6.82 
 
7.41 
 
2013 
 
7.46 
 
9.01 
 
6.72 
 
7.45 
 
2014 
 
7.54 
 
9.08 
 
6.66 
 
7.34 
 
2015 
 
7.57 
 
9.07 
 
6.83 
 
7.70 
 
2016 
 
7.56 
 
9.14 
 
7.03 
 
7.71 
Note: This table reports the mean value in each year for economic freedom and regulation variables. 
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4.3 Empirical results based on the Fixed-Effects method 
Tables 5 and 6 report the Fixed-Effects estimation results on equations (1a, 1b) for bank performance 
and risk-taking as the dependent variables. The effect of economic freedom (EC-FR) on performance 
is positive and significant at the 1% level only for net interest margin, rendering support to 
hypothesis H1.a. Our results are consistent with Wah Low et al. (2010) who found that economic 
freedom increased bank performance in Singapore during the period 1975-2006. A possible 
explanation is that a competitive banking market can exploit the benefits of broad banking activities 
(Sufian and Majid, 2011). Moreover, the effect of economic freedom is positive for Z-Score and 
Tier1-capital but negative and statistically significant for non-performing loans, providing support 
for hypothesis H1.d. According to Barth et al. (2006) in terms of diversification there are many 
benefits for banks from range activities.  
The estimated coefficient of credit regulation (CR-REG) is positive and significant at the 1% level 
for return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity (ROAE). The positive impact of 
liberal credit regulation on bank performance is in line with previous studies (Chortareas et al., 2013; 
Sufian and Habibullah, 2010) who show that permitting banks to engage in a range of activities leads 
to economic growth. Thus, we accept hypothesis H2.1.a. However, the results regarding the effect of 
credit regulation on bank risk-taking are not significant (Table 6) and hence, we reject both 
hypotheses H2.1.C and H.2.1.d.  
Furthermore, the results regarding the coefficient of labor regulation (LB-REG) on bank 
performance is positive for the net interest margin at the 1% level (Table 5), rendering support for 
hypothesis H2.2.a. As mentioned by Psillaki and Mamatzakis (2017) liberal reforms in the labor 
market may increase bank efficiency as they reduce employee complacency and associated 
absenteeism (Riphahn, 2004).  Regarding the risk-taking of banks, it is observed from Table 6 that 
labor regulation increases the proportion of Tier1-capital ratio. This means that relaxing regulation 
contributes to financial stability (Barth et al., 2013). Hence, we accept hypothesis H2.2.d.  
Moreover, we find that the coefficient of business regulation (BS-REG) has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on bank performance for all proxies at the 1% level. This means that 
liberal business regulation improves bank performance. One possible explanation is that fewer 
restrictions concerning new companies are more likely to increase bank efficiency (Psillaki and 
Mamatzakis, 2017). Therefore, hypothesis H2.3.a is confirmed. Additionally, the effect of business 
regulation is negatively related with bank risk-taking when measured by non-performing loans 
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(Table 6). Thus, liberal business regulations are beneficial for banks as they make it easy for banks to 
assess the creditworthiness of a company which in turn leads to lower levels of non-performing loans 
(Loayza et al., 2005). Consequently, we accept hypothesis H2.3.d. 
As far as concerns control variables are concerned, bank size (LNTA) appears to be negatively and 
statistically significant at the 1% for Tobin’sQ and return on average assets (ROAA). A possible 
explanation is that the increase of portfolio diversification leads to lower risks and therefore lower 
return for banks. Our findings support previous researches conducted by Staikouras et al. (2007), 
Belhaj and Mateus (2016), among others. Moreover, the impact of bank size on risk-taking is 
positive and significant at the 1% level for Z-Score.  
The effect of capital ratio (CAPITAL) is positive and statistically significant in all performance 
measures except for Tobin’sQ and return on average assets (ROAA). This positive relationship 
indicates that banks with high capitalization perform better (Pathan and Faff, 2013, Das and Ghosh, 
2006; Psillaki and Mamatzakis, 2017). As a result, banks with better high capitalization are more 
stable. However, the results regarding the coefficient of capital ratio on risk-taking are mixed; 
positive and significant at the 1% level for Tier1-cpaital but negative at different levels for Z-Score 
and on-performing loans. Banks that are active in lending business have more risky investments. As 
mentioned by Berger et al. (2012) risky banks also hold on average more off-balance-sheet items. 
This indicates that these items are not used to offset risks on the balance sheet, but rather as an 
additional instrument to engage in risky investments.  
The GDP growth appears to be positively and statistically significant at different levels regardless of 
how performance is measured. One possible explanation is that higher levels of GDP growth are 
associated with less credit risk and more bank performance (Agoraki et al., 2011). In addition, there 
is no statistically significant relationship to any bank risk indicator and GDP growth. Moreover, the 
impact of inflation (INF) on bank performance is negative and significant at different levels for all 
measures except from return on average equity (ROAE). A possible explanation is that a high level 
of inflation is associated with more costs and therefore, decreases bank performance (Kasman and 
Yildirim, 2006; Pasiouras et al., 2009). Also, the coefficient of inflation on bank risk-taking is 
positive and significant at the 1% level for non-performing loans, and thus, contributes to credit risk 
(Table 6).  
The effect of capital stock market capitalization to GDP (MACGDP) is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level for all performance measures except for the net interest margin (Table 5). 
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Moreover, the impact of stock market capitalization to GDP on bank risk-taking is negative at the 
1% level for both Z-Score and Tier1-capital ratio but positive at the 1% level for non-performing 
loans. A possible explanation is that in a well-developed country, businesses have the opportunity to 
rely on equity rather than on bank finance (Pasiouras et al., 2009). 
Moreover, the presence of foreign banks (FOREIGN) appears to be positively and statistically 
significant at the 10% level for net interest margin. A possible explanation is that when banks 
operate within a highly concentrated market, they have the ability to charge high loan rates. Our 
findings support previous research conducted by Ataullah and Le (2006) among others. However, the 
impact of the presence of foreign banks on risk-taking is not significant.  
Also, we consider the ratio of loans to total assets as a proxy for asset utilization (LOANSTA). Our 
results are mixed; we show a negative relationship between loans to total assets and bank 
performance for Tobin’sQ and net interest margin but a positive and significant at the 1% 
significance level for return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity (ROAE); the 
negative association between asset utilization and bank efficiency may reflect greater pressure in 
containing costs of credit origination and monitoring for larger loan portfolios. Moreover, our 
findings indicate that the effect of asset utilization on risk-taking is negative for Z-Score and Tier1-
capital ratio at the 1% level. 
The effect of board size (BS) on performance is positive and significant at the 1% and 5% level for 
return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity (ROAE) respectively. A large number 
of directors on boards may contribute positively to the decision-making process and, hence, improve 
the performance of banks. Regarding the risk-taking, we show that the effect of board size is 
negative and significant at the 10% level for non-performing loans but positive and significant at the 
5% level for Tier1-capital ratio (Table 6). Thus, when we consider macroeconomic variables, the 
findings regarding the relationship between board size and risk-taking change on the Fixed-Effects 
model. One possible explanation is that high levels of economic freedom in conjunction with less 
labor regulation could lead to better decisions and less risk-taking through higher labor force 
participation. This means that in such environments the different skills and experiences of board 
members may constitute a large board more efficient. 
In Table 5 we find that the estimated coefficient of the financial experience (EXPER) of directors is 
positive and significant at different levels for all measures except for Tobin’sQ. Experienced 
directors have a better understanding of the dynamics and complexity of the banking market activity 
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and its regulatory environment. Regarding the risk-taking of banks, it is observed from Table 6 that 
the experience of directors reduces the percentage of non-performing loans (NPL) and increases Z-
Score. Thus, the impact of macroeconomic variables does not change the effect of financial 
experience on both bank performance and risk-taking. 
Gender diversity increases bank performance when measured by net interest margin (Table 5). This 
result indicates that female directors (FEMALE) are more effective than men in monitoring. 
Moreover, the results (Table 6) regarding the effect of female directors on risk-taking indicate that 
the presence of women on boards reduces bank risk when measured by Z-Score ratio. Consequently, 
the implementation of macroeconomic variables does not alter the effect of gender diversity on bank 
risk-taking.  
In addition, from Table 5 we observe that the compensation of directors (COMPENSATION) has a 
positive and significant impact on all performance measures. Also, the impact of compensation, 
which is measured by cash and bonus, on bank risk-taking is positive and significant at the 10% level 
only for the Tier1-capital ratio. Therefore, the macroeconomic conditions do not change the impact 
of compensation on both bank performance and risk-taking. Thus, an increase in cash bonuses lowers 
bank risk. 
               Table 5: Empirical results for bank performance based on Fixed-Effects 
Variables          Tobin’sQ ROAA ROAE NIM 
 
EC-FR 
 
              0.0258 
 
   -0.372 
 
      0.046 
 
0.0332** 
              (0.276)            (0.330)     (0.142) (0.05) 
CR-REG              -0.0014 
   0.0354*** 0.0604*** 0.0073 
              (0.223)           (0.000)            (0.000) (0.514) 
LB-REG               0.0044           -0.055    0.0132 0.0114*** 
               (0.295)          (0.462)    (0.395) (0.001) 
BS-REG 
              0.011***   0.245***           0.085*** 0.0151*** 
                (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
LNTA 
           -0.0856***    -0.064***     -0.345 0.0453 
               (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.293) (0.200) 
 CAPITAL               0.00267 
   0.016 
    0.071** 0.0353*** 
               (0.234)   (0.407)    (0.04) (0.000) 
LOANSTA 
            -0.0082***     0.381*** 0.0386*** -0.08612*** 
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               (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP 
               0.015*     0.0531***     0.119*** 0.0612 
               (0.10)           (0.001)  (0.000) (0.211) 
INF 
             -0.0041***           -0.055*   -0.155 -0.0377** 
               (0.001)            (0.10) (0.192) (0.04) 
MACGDP 
              -0.077***   -0.0126***     -0.213*** -0.0119 
               (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.221) 
FOREIGN               0.00589 -0.00438 -0.232 0.0821* 
               (0.209) (0.313)  (0.271) (0.06) 
BS               0.0025 
    0.0144***  0.0528** 0.0126 
 
             (0.539)   (0.001)       (0.05) (0.165) 
EXPER 
              -0.015 
  0.0521**           0.0985**     0.0325*** 
 
              (0.238)    (0.05)       (0.05) (0.000) 
FEMALE 
               0.0017   0.0013       0.0596 0.0564* 
 
              (0.287)   (0.199)        (0.185) (0.10) 
COMPENSATION 
             0.00289 
  0.00625*         0.0076* 0.00269 
 
              (0.166)   (0.09)      (0.10) (0.231) 
Constant 
              1.632***   2.45***           3.78***   2.214*** 
              (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations                758 784 649 657 
Adjusted R2               0.217  0.224    0.267 0.231 
N. of Banks                 73 73 73 73 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank 
performance (PERFOR) which measured by Tobin’sQ, ROAA, ROAE and NIM. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Table 1 Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-
values are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 6: Empirical results for bank risk based on Fixed Effects 
Variables Z-Score NPL Tier1-Capital 
 
EC-FR 
 
0.0865* 
 
 -0.0425*** 
 
      0.0497*** 
 (0.10) (0.001) (0.003) 
CR-REG 0.0127 0.0240 0.0159 
 (0.178) (0.179) (0.189) 
LB-REG -0.01185 -0.0351 
     0.0167*** 
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 (0.288) (0.246) (0.001) 
BS-REG 0.0872 -0.0177*** 0.0592 
 (0.129) (0.000) (0.411) 
LNTA 0.02574* 0.0340  0.0432 
 (0.10) (0.143) (0.107) 
 CAPITAL -0.0866*** -0.0194**   0.0778*** 
 (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) 
LOANSTA -0.0285*** -0.01305  -0.0460*** 
 (0.000) (0.289) (0.000) 
GDP -0.0306 -0.1144 0.0988 
 (0.261) (0.157) (0.156) 
INF -0.0206 0.0670*** -0.0074 
 (0.175) (0.000) (0.198) 
MACGDP 
  -0.0287*** 0.0788*** -0.0967*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FOREIGN -0.0132 0.0231 0.04752 
 (0.257) (0.151) (0.109) 
BS 0.0372 -0.1029* 0.0457** 
 (0.313) (0.06) (0.05) 
EXPER 0.0668** -0.0282*** 0.0102 
 (0.05) (0.000) (0.128) 
FEMALE 0.0141* -0.0381 0.0991 
 (0.10) (0.161) (0.192) 
COMPENSATION 0.00635 0.00958 
 0.821*** 
 (0.222) (0.131) (0.000) 
Constant 
  2.337*** 3.432***  3.752*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)                (0.000) 
Observations 758 612                  753 
N. of Banks 74 67                   74 
Adjusted R2 0.318 0.284                 0.243 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank risk 
(RISK) which measured by Z-Score, NPL and Tier1-Capital. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. 
Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in 
parentheses.  
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4.3.1 Decomposing credit market regulation  
To investigate further the impact of credit regulation on bank performance and risk-taking we next 
consider its main components. These are the percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks 
(CR-OWN), the government borrowing that does not crowd out private sector borrowing (CR-PR) 
and the limitation in the interest rates controls (CR-IR) that lead to high spreads and/or negative real 
interest rates (Psillaki and Mamatzakis, 2017). The models, described by equations 3a and 3b below, 
are estimated using the Fixed-Effects method. 
Bank performance model 
(PERFOR)i,t=β
0
+β
1
CR-OWNi,t+β
2
CR-PRi,t+β
3
CR-IRi,t+β
5
LNTAi,t+β
6
CAPITALi,+β7LOANSTAi,t+ 
β
8
GDPi,t+β
9
INFi,t+β
10
MACGDPi,t+β
11
FOREIGNi,t+β
12
BSi,t+β
13
EXPERi,t+β
14
FEMALEi,t+β
15
CO
MPENSATIONi,+ ui + εi,t (3a) 
Bank risk model 
(RISK)i,t=β
0
+β
1
CR-OWNi,t+β
2
CR-PRi,t+β
3
CR-IRi,t+β
5
LNTAi,t+β
6
CAPITALi,+β7LOANSTAi,t+ 
β
8
GDPi,t+β
9
INFi,t+β
10
MACGDPi,t+β
11
FOREIGNi,t+β
12
BSi,t+β
13
EXPERi,t+β
14
FEMALEi,t+β
15
CO
MPENSATIONi,+ ui + εi,t (3b) 
Where PERFOR and RISK denote performance and risk-taking respectively for bank i, t the time 
period, ln the natural logarithmic, β the parameters to be estimated, u the unobserved fixed-effect for 
bank i and ε the remaining disturbance term.  
The results in Table 7 indicate that the credit ownership (CR-OWN) variable increases bank 
performance at different levels when measured by Tobin’sQ and net interest margin. One possible 
explanation is that private ownership of banks increases performance through better allocation of 
credit in the economy that results from more adherences to market discipline (Mian, 2003). 
Moreover, the coefficient of the privately owned banks variable (CR-OWN) has no significant 
impact on bank risk-taking regardless of risk proxy. 
Regarding the private sector variable (CR-PR) variable, we find that the impact on bank performance 
is negative and significant for return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity 
(ROAE) at the 1% and 5% levels respectively (Table 7). Our results are in line with those of Psillaki 
and Mamatzakis (2017) and Mamatzakis et al. (2013). One possible explanation is that the private 
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sector is linked to costly monitoring and screening which turn in decreased profitability. However 
the results are mixed for bank risk-taking (Table 8). More precisely, we find that private sector 
borrowing has a negative and significant impact at the 1% level for non-performing loans which 
means which reduces credit risk. Also the impact on Tier1-capital is negative and hence, the 
government borrowing that does not crowd out private sector borrowing leads to a less stable 
banking system. One possible explanation is that when credit is directed to state the financial system 
is more stable. 
The coefficient of interest rate controls (CR-IR) has a negative and significant impact on bank 
performance for almost all proxies except for Tobin’sQ at different levels (Table 7). Concerning the 
effect on risk-taking, we show in Table 8 that the interest rate control variables (CR-IR) increase 
bankruptcy. One possible explanation is that interest rate controls act as barriers for banks to take on 
increased risk and high-return projects (Hellman et al., 2000).  
Concerning the impact of board size (BS) on bank performance when we employ the sub-
components is positive and significant at the 5% level for return on average assets (ROAA). Our 
results are consistent with those from Table 5 which argue that a large number of directors on boards 
may contribute positively to the decision-making process and, hence, improve bank performance. 
Regarding risk-taking the results are the same as in Table 6. More precisely, we show that the effect 
of board size is negative and significant at the 5% level for non-performing loans (Table 8).  
In Table 7 we find that the estimated coefficient of the financial experience (EXPER) of directors is 
positive and significant at different levels for all measures, as in Fixed-Effects model (Table 5). 
Experienced directors have a better understanding of the complexity of financial activities and its 
regulatory environment. Regarding the risk-taking of banks, it is observed from Table 6 that the 
experience of directors reduces the percentage of non-performing loans (NPL) and increases Z-Score 
and Tier1-capital as in Table 6.  
Gender diversity (FEMALE) has no significant impact on bank performance for any measure (Table 
7). Moreover, the results regarding the effect of female directors on risk-taking are the same as in 
Table 6. More precisely, the presence of women on boards reduces bank risk when measured by Z-
Score ratio. Female directors are more risk averse than men. Finally, from Tables 7 and 8 we observe 
that the compensation of directors (COMPENSATION) has no significant impact on bank 
performance and risk-taking.  
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Table 7: The impact of the Fraser sub-components of the Credit Regulation index on bank 
performance 
Variables                Tobin’sQ    ROAA ROAE NIM 
CR-OWN  0.00864* 0.0198 -0.827    0.126*** 
 
                 (0.08) (0.713) (0.984) (0.000) 
CR-PR                 -0.00216   -0.227*** -0.254** -0.0501 
 
                 (0.361)               (0.001) (0.04) (0.327) 
CR-IR                 -0.00909   -0.451*** -0.3888*  -0.220*** 
 
                 (0.765)              (0.000) (0.10) (0.002) 
GDP 
                 0.00048**   0.112***    0.1731*** 0.00514 
 
                  (0.02)              (0.001) (0.000) (0.732) 
INF 
                -0.0016 
    -0.0241** -0.524 0.0309** 
 (0.432)      (0.03) (0.546) (0.04) 
CAPITAL 0.00386**   0.0394*** 0.274 -0.00741 
                   (0.02)             (0.001) (0.194) (0.649) 
LNTA 0.00254 -0.150*** -0.436*** -0.177*** 
 (0.174)              (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
LOANSTA -0.478***              0.00340 -0.315***   0.0163*** 
                   (0.01)              (0.354) (0.000)          (0.002) 
  MACGDP   0.0994***    0.00693***  0.124*** -0.00169 
 
                 (0.000)              (0.002) (0.000) (0.152) 
  FOREIGN                 -0.00284 0.00571**  0.0624*   0.00558** 
 
                 (0.312)              (0.04)              (0.10)           (0.05) 
  BS -0.00749              0.181**              1.990 -0.0208 
 
(0.596)              (0.08) (1.216) (0.0501) 
  EXPER    0.00238** 0.0714***    0.885***   0.0317*** 
 
(0.001)             (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
  FEMALE -0.00426             -0.00849 -0.0157 0.00188 
 
(0.284)              (0.525) (0.731) (0.250) 
  COMPENSATION -0.00839 0.00417 0.00617 -0.00130 
   
(0.179)              (0.328) (0.452) (0.151) 
Constant   0.567***              1.896**  1.447***  2.494*** 
 
                  (0.000)              (0.05) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations                     482      567               555              567 
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Adjusted R2                   0.294     0.287              0.257             0.301 
N. of Banks                     67       73                73                73 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank 
performance (PERFOR) which measured by Tobin’sQ, ROAA, ROAE and NIM. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-
values are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 8: The impact of the Fraser sub-components of the Credit Regulation index on bank risk 
Variables               Z-Score        NPL             Tier1-Capital 
 CR-OWN -0.00821 0.397 -0.00680 
 
(0.135) (0.353) (0.124) 
 CR-PR 0.0454   -0.837*** -0.194* 
 
(0.115) (0.000) (0.10) 
 CR-IR -0.828*** 0.897 -0.475** 
 
(0.000) (0.619) (0.05) 
 GDP 0.0161 -0.125 -0.0357 
 
(0.255) (0.780) (0.247) 
 INF -0.0520   -0.680*** -0.0277 
 
(0.474) (0.000) (0.482) 
 LNTA 0.0341 0.236 -0.0682 
 
(0.170) (0.285) (0.101) 
 CAPITAL    0.952***   0.272***    0.903*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOANSTA               0.0118 -0.0215                  -0.0280*** 
 
              (0.993) (0.219)                   (0.001) 
 MACGDP    0.0301***  -0.0872***                  -0.0279 
 
              (0.001) (0.001)                   (0.481) 
FOREIGN              -0.0160 -0.0376**                  0.00161 
 
              (0.121)               (0.05)                  (0.675) 
BS              -0.250 -1.028**                   0.0704 
 
             (0.178) (0.05)                   (0.163) 
EXPER               0.0603* -0.223**                   0.0574* 
 
              (0.10) (0.05)                    (0.10) 
FEMALE               0.0164* -0.00642 0.0210** 
 
              (0.10) (0.252)                   (0.05) 
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COMPENSATION 0.00435 0.00947                 -0.00356 
 
               (0.518) (0.154)                   (0.595) 
Constant   2.129***   1.953***                    1.755*** 
 
               (0.000) (0.000)                   (0.000) 
Observations           568       506                     559 
 Adjusted R2            0.297      0.265                    0.258 
N. of banks          73        65            72 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank risk 
(RISK) which measured by Z-Score, NPL and Tier1-Capital. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. 
Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
4.4 Empirical results based on the two-step system GMM method 
We report the system estimator regression results in Tables 9 and 10. In line with our previous 
results, economic freedom (EC-FR) is positively related to bank performance at different levels for 
all measures apart from net interest margin. This positive relationship between economic freedom 
and bank performance was indicated by the Fixed-Effects method. Thus, hypothesis H1.a is 
accepted. Countries with heavy regulation reduce opportunities, and hence, decrease competition. 
Moreover, the effect of economic freedom on risk-taking is positive and statistically significant for 
the Z-Score ratio and Tier1-capital ratio but negative for non-performing loans (NPL), rendering 
support to hypothesis H1.d. Our results indicate that more economic freedom is associated with a 
lower probability of default due to high competition and economic growth. Thus, economic freedom 
promotes financial system soundness.  
Similarly, as before, credit regulation (CR-REG) is positively related to bank performance at the 1% 
level for the Tobin’sQ ratio, the return on average assets (ROAA) and the return on average equity 
(ROAE), at different levels, providing support for hypothesis H2.1.a. In contradiction to our previous 
findings, the results regarding the coefficient of credit regulation on risk-taking are mixed. More 
precisely, credit regulation (CR-REG) is positively related to bank risk at the 1% level for Z-Score 
ratio and at the 10% level for non-performing loans (NPL). As a consequence, the liberal credit 
regulation increases credit risk (Table 10). One possible explanation for this result is that stricter 
regulation in combination with a high level of market power contributes to reduction of credit risk 
(Agoraki et al., 2011). Thus, we accept both hypotheses H2.1.c and H2.1.d.  
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The effect of labor regulation (LB-REG) on bank performance is positive and significant, as before, 
for all proxies at different levels, except for net interest margin Thus, we accept hypothesis H2.2.a. 
One possible explanation is that greater regulation reduces competition and thus, leads to low levels 
of bank efficiency (Scarpetta and Tressel, 2004). Concerning the effect of labor regulation on risk-
taking the results remain the same, with those from Fixed-Effects model (Table 6). More precisely, 
liberal labor regulation reduces risk-taking, as we find a positive and significant relationship for Z-
score but negative for non-performing loans (Table 10). Therefore, we accept hypothesis H2.2.d. 
The results regarding business regulation (BS-REG) on bank performance are the same as before. 
Based on the two-step system GMM method (Table 9), we find a positive and significant relationship 
between business regulation and bank performance for all proxies apart from net interest margin. 
Thus, we accept hypothesis H.2.3.a. Moreover, the effect of business regulation on risk-taking is 
positive and statistically significant for the Z-Score ratio but negative for non-performing loans 
(NPL) at the 1% level (Table 10), rendering support to hypotheses H2.3.c and H2.3.d. A possible 
explanation for this result is that liberal regulation of the business market leads to low levels of non-
performing loans and therefore to less credit risk. 
Contrary to our previous results the effect of bank size (LNTA) on performance is now positive and 
significant at different levels for almost all proxies except for return on average assets (ROAA). 
Larger banks are expected to use better technology, be more diversified and better managed. Larger 
banks may also enjoy economies of scale. Regarding risk-taking, the results remain the same as in 
the Fixed-Effects model. More precisely, the effect of size (LNTA) on bank risk-taking is positive 
and significant at the 1% level for Z-Score and Tier1-capital ratio (Table 10), in line with the too-
big-to-fail concept. 
Our results in Table 9 show a positive relationship between tighter capital regulation (CAPITAL) 
and bank performance for all performance measures. In line with our previous findings, the effect of 
capital ratio is negative at the 5% level for non-performing loans (NPL) but positive at the 1% level 
for Z-Score and Tier1-capital ratio. Well-capitalized banks have the required liquidity in order to 
manage credit risk.  
According to the GDP growth (GDP) the sign of the relationship remains constant and positive for 
bank performance as on the Fixed-Effects model. In contradiction to our previous results, we find 
that the impact of GDP growth on bank risk-taking is positive and significant at the 5% level for Z-
Score. More, precisely, banks with higher leverage tend to decrease probability of default (Table 10). 
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Our result corroborates research conducted by Agoraki et al. (2011) who claim that high levels of 
GDP growth increase bank soundness.  
Concerning the relationship between bank performance and inflation (INF) the results are the same 
as on the Fixed-Effects model (Table 5).  More precisely, the inflation is negative and significant at 
the 1% level for almost all proxies apart from net interest margin (NIM). One possible explanation 
for this result is that a lower inflationary environment is more conducive to bank activities (Barth et 
al., 2013). Similarly, the results regarding the impact of the inflation variable on risk-taking remain 
the same in the two-step system GMM model. According to Table 10 we find a positive and 
significant relationship between inflation and bank risk-taking, measured by non-performing loans at 
the 10% level, meaning that high levels on inflation increase credit risk.   
In contradiction to our previous results the effect of stock market capitalization to GDP (MACGDP) 
is positive and significant at the 1% level for return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average 
equity (ROAE). Our results are in line with those of Barth et al. (2006) and Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) among others, who found a positive relationship between stock market 
capitalization and bank performance. According to the authors, this positive relationship could be 
explained due to the complementary effect between debt and equity financing (Pasiouras et al, 2009).  
Moreover, the results regarding the effect of stock market capitalization (MACGDP) on bank risk-
taking are different from those using the Fixed-Effects model (Table 6). More precisely, the stock 
market capitalization is positive and significant at different levels for both Z-Score and Tier1-capital 
but negative for non-performing loans at the 1% level, meaning that stock market capitalization 
reduces credit risk and contributes to the financial stability. 
Regarding the effect of the presence of foreign banks (FOREIGN) the results are not the same as 
before. Based on the two-step system GMM model in Table 9 we show that there is no significant 
relationship between bank performance and foreign banks. Moreover, regarding bank risk-taking the 
results are mixed (Table 10) and different from those of the Fixed-Effects model (Table 6). More 
precisely, we find that foreign banks increase credit risk as they are positively linked to non-
performing loans but they also enhance the Tier1-capital ratio.  
Contrary to our previous results the effect of loans to total assets (LOANSTA) on bank performance 
is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for all proxies (Table 9). Moreover, our 
findings indicate that the effect of asset utilization on risk-taking is negative for Z-Score and Tier1-
capital ratio at the 5% level but positive and significant at the same level for non-performing loans. 
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One possible explanation for this result is that loans are usually linked to higher operational risks 
and, therefore, they need to be monitored (Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009). 
In addition, the relationship between board size (BS) and performance is negative and significant at 
the 1% for return on average assets (Table 9). Our findings indicate that the board of directors 
becomes less effective when the number of members increases (Pathan and Faff, 2013). The impact 
of board size on risk-taking is negative at the 5% for Z-Score and Tier1-capital ratio (Table 10). A 
liberal economic environment in conjunction with less credit regulation might give the opportunity to 
board members to take more risks and hence, to increase the likelihood of default risk.  
Based on the results in Table 9, we find that the effect of financial experience (EXPER) on bank 
performance is positive and significant at different levels, except for return on average equity 
(ROAE). Furthermore, the experience of directors has a positive impact on credit risk-taking as it is 
positively associated with non-performing loans (Table 10). Our results are the same as those in 
Tables 8 and 9. One possible explanation is that managers often operate in the interest of 
shareholders and hence led to risky decisions. Macroeconomic conditions do not alter the impact of 
financial experience on bank performance and risk-taking.  
Furthermore, in Table 9 we find that the effect of female directors on bank performance is positive 
and significant at different levels except for return on average equity (ROAE). Moreover, the effect 
of female directors (FEMALE) on bank risk-taking is negative and significant at the 1% level for 
non-performing loans (Table 10). Thus, macroeconomic conditions change the impact of gender 
diversity on bank performance and risk-taking when we apply the two-step system GMM model. 
One possible explanation is that in a liberal labor environment the presence of women tends to be 
high. This in turn, leads to less credit risk as women are considered to be less overconfident than 
men, and thus, they do not take risks. 
Concerning the relationship between bank performance and compensation (COMPENSATION) the 
results are the same as in Tables 8 and 9. More precisely, the compensation of directors is positive 
and significant at the 1% level for Tobin’sQ (Table 9). Regarding the risk-taking the impact of 
compensation is negative and significant at the 1% level for both non-performing loans and Tier1-
capital. One possible explanation is that in a more liberal and competitive environment, directors are 
more willing to invest in positive Net Present Value projects (Curi and Murgia, 2018). 
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Table 9: Empirical results for bank performance based on Two-step system GMM method 
Variables Tobin’sQ ROAA ROAE NIM 
 
Tobin’sQ (t-1) 
 
0.722*** 
   
 (0.000)    
ROAA (t-1)  
 0.1196***   
  (0.000)   
ROAE (t-1)   
      0.3756***  
   (0.000)  
NIM (t-1)    
    0.748*** 
    (0.000) 
EC-FR 
   0.0138** 0.05317***  0.1310***  0.0514 
                     (0.05) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.148) 
CR-REG 
        0.0443**     0.271*** 0.0221***   0.0145 
                    (0.02) (0.000) (0.000) (0.241) 
LB-REG 0.0241* 0.115***  0.2005* 0.0129 
 (0.10) (0.001) (0.10) (0.371) 
BS-REG 0.0633*** 0.0296*** 0.0376***   0.0831 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.184) 
GDP 0.0121*** 0.0916*** 0.141*** -0.0507 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.152) 
INF -0.0094*** -0.0628*** -0.197*** 0.0415 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.387) 
CAPITAL 0.0459**  0.0282*** 0.0731*** 0.0114* 
 (0.02) (0.000) (0.000) (0.10) 
LNTA 0.0505***  0.0857 0.0145** 0.0246*** 
 (0.001) (0.158) (0.05) (0.007) 
LOANSTA -0.4636*** -0.176***         -0.128*** -0.0370*** 
                   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  MACGDP 0.00332 0.0108*** 0.115*** -0.0441 
                   (0.416) (0.000) (0.000)          (0.387) 
  FOREIGN  0.00314 0.01233 0.0157  0.01807 
                   (0.283) (0.155) (0.259)          (0.189) 
  BS   0.0442 -0.0203*** 0.3191 -0.0514 
                   (0.203) (0.001) (0.160)          (0.143) 
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  EXPER 
 0.0759** 0.0453*** 0.5351  0.0112** 
 (0.05) (0.001) (0.114) (0.05) 
  FEMALE 0.00276*** 0.0727*** 0.0257 0.0240** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.178) (0.04) 
  COMPENSATION 
 0.4636*** 0.0667 0.00329 0.00113 
 (0.000) (0.133) (0.241) (0.136) 
Constant 0.789*** 1.179*** 2.301*** 0.331*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations                     417 596           548            581 
AR(1) 
       -1.83[0.05]**  -2.08[0.00]***      -3.02[0.00]***     -1.93[0.04]** 
AR(2)                 0.25[0.48] 0.40[0.16]      0.82[0.41]    0.49[0.62] 
Hansen J-stat               105.2 [0.65]       167.4 [0.49]     172.7 [0.58]   175.9 [0.82] 
N. of instruments          204             257            222            235 
N. of Banks                     73  75             75            75 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Two-step system GMM method. The dependent variable is 
bank performance (PERFOR) which measured by Tobin’sQ, ROAA, ROAE and NIM. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-
values are reported in parentheses.                  
 
Table 10: Empirical results for bank risk based on Two-step system GMM 
Variables                 Z-Score      NPL      Tier1-Capital 
 
Z-Score (t-1) 
 
                 0.6853*** 
  
                 (0.000)   
NPL (t-1)  
    1.115***  
  (0.000)  
Tier1-Capital (t-1)   
         0.305*** 
       (0.000) 
 EC-FR 
              0.1145***  -0.0284*    0.0267*** 
 (0.003)          (0.076)             (0.001) 
 CR-REG 
        0.2391***     0.0460*         0.00222 
 (0.008) (0.060)            (0.857) 
 LB-REG 
              0.2415**   -0.0889***             0.00875 
 (0.013) (0.006)             (0.599) 
 BS-REG 
              0.0611***    -0.0134***              -0.00223 
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 (0.000)           (0.001)              (0.252) 
 GDP 0.0259** -0.0151               0.00747 
 (0.032)          (0.106)              (0.112) 
 INF -1.009*** 0.605*          -0.686*** 
 (0.000)          (0.055)             (0.000) 
 LNTA 0.585***            -0.0638              0.129*** 
 (0.000)         (0.471)             (0.000) 
 CAPITAL  0.493***   -0.0633**              0.700*** 
 (0.000)        (0.030)             (0.000) 
 LOANSTA -0.916** 0.178**             -1.040** 
 (0.024)        (0.031)           (0.014) 
 MACGDP 0.0316***   -0.0681***              0.0669** 
 (0.000)        (0.000)                      (0.005) 
FOREIGN -0.0280 
          0.0100               0.0123*** 
 (0.317)         (0.207)            (0.000) 
BS -0.1802**          -0.0184             -0.0233** 
 (0.000)         (0.132)            (0.018) 
EXPER -0.049**   0.0118***              0.0322 
 (0.024)         (0.001)            (0.335) 
FEMALE  0.0360 
        -0.0302***             -0.00461 
 (0.130)         (0.000)            (0.226) 
COMPENSATION -0.0049 
 -0.00349***             0.00662*** 
 (0.317)         (0.000)            (0.000) 
Constant -1.157***       -6.969** 0.706*** 
 (0.000)        (0.014)             (0.000) 
Observations         638         587    582 
AR(1) 
         -2.76[0.000]***      -2.08[0.000]***                -2.23[0.000]*** 
AR(2)          0.91[0.365]       -1.54[0.125] 0.44[0.663] 
Hansen J-stat        167.2 [0.54]             156.4 [0.72]        179.3 [0.78] 
N. of instruments         254 183    152 
N. of banks       72 71    70 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Two-step system GMM method. The dependent variable is 
bank risk (RISK) which measured by Z-Score, NPL and Tier1-Capital. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 
1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported 
in parentheses.  
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4.5 Empirical results for the period before, during (2004-2009) and after (2010-2016) the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
In this section, we divide the sample into two periods, the first concerning the period before and 
during the Global Financial crisis (2004-2009) and the second concerning the period after the crisis 
(2010-2016). Tables 11 and 12 below show the results based on the Fixed-Effects method (models 
1a, 1b). 
The sign of the effect of economic freedom (EC-FR) is positively related to bank performance before 
and during the financial crisis but has no significant impact for the period after the financial crisis 
(Table 11), providing support for hypothesis H3.a. Moreover, the impact of economic freedom on 
risk-taking is positive for Z-Score ratio but negative for non-performing loans (NPL) and significant 
at different levels for the period before and during the financial crisis meaning that economic 
freedom contributes to financial stability. One possible explanation is that financial liberalization 
promotes financial development through increased competition (Baier et al., 2012). However, the 
effect of economic freedom regulation is negative for Z-Score and Tier1-capital but positive for non-
performing loans at different levels for the period after the global financial (Table 12), rendering 
support to hypothesis H3.b. This means that stricter regulation and the compliance of banks with 
principles may prevent financial institutions from excessive risk-taking.  
In addition, the effect of the credit regulation (CR-REG) variable on bank performance varies. More 
precisely, we find that there is no significant impact for the period before and during the financial 
crisis on bank performance (Table 11). However, the impact of credit regulation is negative and 
significant at different levels for both return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity 
(ROAE). One possible explanation is that after a post-crisis period credit regulation tends to increase 
so as to contribute to financial stability (Baier et al.2012). Thus, we accept hypothesis H3.a.  
Moreover, the impact of credit regulation (CR-REG) on risk-taking is positive for Z-Score ratio and 
Tier1-capital ratio but negative and significant for non-performing loans (NPL) at different levels for 
the period before and during the financial crisis, meaning that liberal credit regulation reduces bank 
risk-taking as it promotes competition and gives opportunities to banks to exploit economies of scale. 
However, the effect of credit regulation on risk-taking changes after the financial crisis (Table 12). 
More precisely, the impact of credit regulation is positive for non-performing loans but negative for 
Z-Score and Tier1-capital at different levels, rendering support to hypothesis H3.b. This means that 
liberal credit regulation is less pronounced after the global financial crisis. One possible explanation 
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for this finding is that stricter credit regulation improves bank soundness and leads to less risk-taking 
through supervisory power (Ghosh, 2016; Barth et al., 2013). 
Labor regulation (LB-REG) has a positive and significant impact on bank performance at 5% level 
when measured by return on average assets (ROAA) and net interest margin (NIM) for the period 
before and during the financial crisis (Table 11). However, the sign changes for the period after the 
global financial crisis as the impact of liberal labor regulation is negative and significant at the 1% 
level for return on average assets (ROAA), providing support to hypothesis H3.a. One possible 
explanation is that wages pressures would induce higher labor productivity due to capital deepening 
and therefore, would lead to more bank performance (Autor et al., 2007). 
Moreover the sign of labor regulation (LB-REG) on bank risk-taking remains constant and positive 
at the 1% level for Z-Score before, during and after the global financial crisis (GFC). Thus, we reject 
hypothesis H3.b. Our results are in line with those of Mamatzakis et al. (2013) who claimed that 
liberal labor regulation has resulted in productivity gains in Central European Countries during the 
period 2000-2010. One possible explanation is that increased redundancy of unproductive employees 
is associated with more productivity (Eslava et al., 2004). 
The sign of business regulation (BS-REG) is positive and significant at different levels for return on 
average equity (ROAE) and net interest margin before and during the global financial crisis (GFC). 
This means that liberal business regulation increases bank performance. One possible explanation is 
that heavier regulation of entry has higher corruption and hence, may negatively affect economic 
growth and bank performance (Djankov et al., 2003). Furthermore, the effect of business regulation 
(BS-REG) is positive and significant at the 10% level for Tobin’sQ but negative and significant at 
the same level for net interest margin for the period after the crisis (Table 11), rendering support to 
hypothesis H3.a.  
Furthermore, the effect of business regulation (BS-REG) is positive and significant at the 1% level 
before and during the crisis for the Tier1-capital ratio (Table 12). This means that liberal business 
regulation contributes to financial stability. The impact of business regulation on bank risk-taking 
remains the same for the period after the global financial crisis as it reduces the non-performing 
loans ratio and hence, reduces credit risk. One possible explanation is that the fewer number of 
procedures needed to obtain building permits or reducing the time taken to grant legal identity to a 
business would lead to increased competition and more productivity which in turn has a positive 
impact on bank performance. Thus, we reject hypothesis H3.b. 
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According to the GDP growth (GDP) the sign of the relationship remains constant regardless of the 
period. More precisely, the impact of the GDP growth (GDP) is positive and significant for most 
proxies of bank performance for the whole period. One possible explanation is that economic growth 
can enhance bank profitability through increasing the demand for financial transactions such as the 
household and business demand for loans. Regarding risk-taking (Table 12), the impact of GDP 
growth is positive and significant at different levels for Z-Score and negative for non-performing 
loans for the period before, during and after the global financial crisis. This means that strong 
economic conditions are also characterized by a high demand for financial services, thereby 
increasing bank profits and hence, lead to less credit risk. 
The effect of inflation on bank performance (Table 12) is negative and statistically significant at 
different levels for most bank measures. Also, the sign of inflation on bank risk-taking is positive and 
significant at the 1% level for non-performing loans only for the period after the global financial 
crisis (Table 11). A possible explanation is that inflation has a negative effect on bank profitability 
and risk if wages and other costs grow faster than the rate of inflation (Ali, et al., 2011). 
The effect of bank size (LNTA) on bank performance is negative and significant at different levels 
for almost all proxies except for return on average equity (ROAE), for the period before and during 
the financial crisis (Table 11). Although, for the period after the crisis the findings are mixed; 
negative at the 1% level for return on average assets (ROAA) but positive at the same level for net 
interest margin. Regarding risk-taking, the impact of bank size (LNTA) has no significant impact on 
bank risk for any proxy, for the whole period.  
Our results show a positive relationship between tighter capital regulation (CAPITAL) and bank 
performance regardless of the period considered. This means that banks with more equity can meet 
their funding needs and increase their efficiency. However, the effect is significant for most of the 
proxies of bank performance for the period after the financial crisis (Table 11). Similar, are the 
results for the relationship between stricter capital regulation and risk-taking (Table 12). More 
precisely, tighter capital regulation reduces credit risk and probability of bankruptcy for the whole 
period. 
The results regarding the loan to total assets variable are mixed for the period before and during the 
financial crisis (Table 11); negative and significant at the 1% level for Tobin’sQ, return on average 
equity (ROAE) and net interest margin but positive at the same level for return on average assets 
(ROAA). However the effect of loans to assets after the crisis is positive and significant at different 
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levels for return on average assets (ROAA) and net interest margin. One possible explanation is that 
banks with a high intermediation capacity operate more efficiently (Carvallo and Kasman, 2005; 
Mamatzakis et al., 2013). Regarding the effect of loans to total assets (LOANSTA) the sign remains 
positive and significant at the 5% level for the Z-Score ratio for the whole period (Table 12).  
In Table 11 we find, that the results regarding the stock market capitalization (MACGDP) variable 
are mixed for the period before and during the global financial crisis (GFC). Moreover, the impact of 
stock market capitalization is positive and significant at the 1% level for Tobin’sQ and return on 
average equity (ROAE) but negative at the same level for net interest margin. The effect is positive 
and significant at different levels for almost all proxies apart from net interest margin, for the period 
after the global financial crisis. One possible explanation is that in less developed stock markets 
firms tend to rely more on bank finance rather than equity (Pasiouras et al., 2009). Moreover, the 
impact of stock market capitalization to GDP on bank risk-taking remains positive and significant at 
different levels for both Z-Score and Tier1-capital (Table 12). 
The results regarding the effect of the presence of foreign banks (FOREIGN) varies for the period 
before and during the financial crisis (Table 11); negative for return on average assets (ROAA) but 
positive for return on average equity (ROAE). Similarly, the findings regarding the presence of 
foreign banks are inconclusive for the period after the crisis; negative for Tobin’sQ but positive for 
return on average assets (ROAA) and net interest margin. One possible explanation is that the more 
presence of foreign banks may limit the ability of domestic banks to operate efficiently (Lensink et 
al., 2008). However, the effect of foreign banks on risk-taking (Table 12) is positive and significant 
at the 1% level for Tier1-capital ratio for the whole period.  
The sign of the effect of board size (BS) on bank performance (Table 11) changes from insignificant 
to positive for the period after the global financial crisis (GFC). Our results indicate that the presence 
of several directors on the board has a positive effect on the advisory functions, the monitoring and 
the increase of returns (Peni and Vahama, 2012). The sign of the effect of board size (BS) on risk-
taking remains constant and negative for non-performing loans for the period before and after the 
global financial crisis (GFC) which means that the presence of more directors in the board reduces 
credit risk (Table 12). Thus, macroeconomic conditions alter the impact of board size on bank risk-
taking. A possible explanation is that a large board might operate efficiently in an economic freedom 
environment and hence, could lead to better decisions with less risk for the banks, through exploiting 
the different background and skills of directors. 
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In addition, the sign of the financial experience (EXPER) variable on bank performance remains 
constant and positive (Table 11) before, during and after the global financial crisis (GFC). One 
possible explanation is that a better understanding of banking activities by the directors contributes to 
better management supervision. Furthermore, the effect of financial experience (EXPER) is positive 
and significant at the 1% level before and during the financial crisis for Z-Score ratio but has no 
significant impact for the period after the crisis (Table 12). This means that more experienced 
directors contribute to the financial stability. Macroeconomic conditions do not change the impact of 
financial experience on bank performance and risk-taking. 
Gender diversity (FEMALE) has a positive and significant impact on bank performance at the 5% 
level for the whole period. However, the effect of female directors (FEMALE) on risk-taking is 
positive and significant at the 5% level for Tier1-capital ratio only for the whole period but negative 
and significant at the 5% level for non-performing loans for the period after the crisis (Table 12). 
Thus, the implementation of macroeconomic conditions does not change the impact of women on 
bank performance and risk-taking. One possible explanation is that women are more risk-averse in 
the financial decision making-process (Barber and Odean, 2001).  
The sign of the compensation on bank performance is positive and significant at different levels 
regardless of the period before and during the global financial crisis (GFC). However, the 
compensation variable has no significant impact on bank performance after the global financial crisis 
(Table 11). Regarding risk-taking, the effect of compensation of directors is positive and significant 
at the 10% level for Z-Score. In a liberal labor environment directors have more incentives to 
promote bank soundness which would be linked to more bonuses.   
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Table 11: Empirical results for bank performance before, during and after the global financial crisis 
2004-2009 
  
                                                       2010-2016 
Variables Tobin’sQ ROΑA ROΑE NΙM                Tobin’sQ ROΑA ROΑE NΙΜ 
 
EC-FR 
 
  0.0554*** 
 
  0.01285* 
 
 -0.03948 
 
   -0.161 
 
  0.0432 
 
0.373 
 
-0.8069 
 
-0.157 
 (0.001) (0.10) (0.388) (0.430) (0.452) (0.570) (0.157) (0.243) 
CR-REG       -0.00661  0.00567 0.5748   0.0522                0.00541 
  -0.3166**     -0.571*** 0.0422 
 (0.137) (0.245) (0.532)  (0.396) (0.226) (0.05) (0.000) (0.424) 
LB-REG  0.00134 
 0.09061** 0.5575   0.1097**   0.0326  -0.3967*** -2.158 -0.0164 
 (0.230) (0.05) (0.468) (0.05) (0.187) (0.003) (0.444) (0.509) 
BS-REG         0.03431   0.0989 0.2018*   0.1518**    0.0745* -0.29053 -3.687 -0.182* 
 (0.164) (0.135) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10) (0.204) (0.124) (0.010) 
 GDP 0.00292*** 0.00321*** 0.1065*** -0.00123 0.00412 0.251***    1.488*** 0.00184 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.198) (0.211) (0.000) (0.001) (0.102) 
  INF -0.0484*** -0.00245*** -0.0200 -0.056**                    -0.0318* 0.0930 -0.00327 -0.0366** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.597) (0.05) (0.10) (0.0823) (0.289) (0.05) 
LNTA -0.01139* -0.0315 -0.180*** -0.0227***   0.0513 -0.175*** -1.260 0.0170*** 
 (0.10) (0.287) (0.004) (0.000)                     (0.452) (0.001) (0.170) (0.000) 
CAPITAL -0.00126 0.0215** 0.0271 -0.01837                   0.0457*** 0.108***    0.217*** -0.00751 
 (0.278) (0.05) (0.781) (0.125)                     (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.630) 
LOANSTA 
          -1.553***   1.212*** -0.8589***  -0.788***              0.6321 0.0111* 0.153   0.0270*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000)                     (0.120) (0.010) (0.110) (0.003) 
  MACGDP 
            0.0659***    0.00751 0.1232***  -0.0047***                     -0.4320***    0.0216*** 0.217** 0.00182 
 (0.001) (0.234) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.101) (0.211) 
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  FOREIGN 
         -0.00102 
   -0.00269*** 0.0715**   0.00474         -0.0692**        0.0070*** 0.0410   0.00733* 
 (0.520)  (0.001) (0.005) (0.118)                (0.05) (0.000) (0.220)         (0.10) 
  BS 
         0.03489    0.00482 -0.3948   0.08081         0.751***   0.0292* 0.532*   0.0150** 
                     (0.431) (0.211) (0.286) (0.317)                (0.001) (0.10) (0.000)         (0.05) 
  EXPER 
          0.0313**    0.0721*** 0.6871***   0.0480***         0.129***      0.749***    0.351***    0.795*** 
                     (0.05)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)                (0.001)     (0.000) (0.000)         (0.000) 
  FEMALE 
       -0.00102    0.00213 0.0267 
  0.08556**                  0.0963    0.00997  0.184** -0.00311 
                    (0.153) (0.312) (0.540) (0.05)                 (0.254) (0.125) (0.05)          (0.229) 
  COMPENSATION 
       0.00802    0.00711 0.00141***   0.00463**        0.00657    0.00856  0.00620 -0.0888 
                    (0.397)  (0.296) (0.000) (0.005)                 (0.001) (0.195) (0.121)          (0.142) 
Constant 
           1.186***   2.245*** 2.281***  1.531***                 1.834***    2.103***   2.32***   3.485** 
                    (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)                 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000)           (0.05) 
Observations                      257             257   257 257                   339    375 389   390 
Adjusted R2                    0.198 0.202 0.164 0.257                 0.230   0.312 0.220 0.258 
N. of banks                     75              75    75 75                   75       75 75 75 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank performance (PERFOR) which measured by Tobin’sQ, ROAA, ROAE and NIM. Definitions of all 
variables are provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 12: Empirical results for bank risk before, during and after the global financial crisis 
2004-2009 2010-2016 
 
Variables 
 
Z-Score 
 
     NPL 
 
                   Tier1-Capital 
 
                   Z-Score 
 
           NPL 
 
   Tier1-Capital 
 
EC-FR 
 
                 0.526*** 
 
         -0.911* 
 
                0.589 
 
-0.4032*** 
 
           0.812** 
 
         -1.769*** 
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                 (0.000)        (0.10)               (0.122) (0.000)             (0.012)           (0.000) 
CR-REG                 0.745**       -0.672***      0.541**                    -0.697**       1.989***      -0.360** 
 
                (0.05)   (0.000)  (0.05)                     (0.05)   (0.000)  (0.05) 
LB-REG       0.0362*** -1.321  0.0962                    1.036*** -1.050  0.0615 
 
               (0.000)   (0.322)   (0.138)                    (0.000)   (0.671)   (0.185) 
BS-REG                -0.245 -0.872                          0.611***                   -0.112     -0.331** 0.361 
 
               (0.126)   (0.407) 
                        (0.001)                   (0.676)   (0.000)                  (0.034) 
 GDP  0.201**      -0.811***  0.0745                    0.160**      -0.941***  0.0224 
 
               (0.05)   (0.001)   (0.420)                    (0.04)   (0.001)   (0.464) 
INF               -0.9102                1.012 -0.463                   -0.0823     1.934*** 0.102 
 
              (0.169)  (0.421)  (0.514)                   (0.124)  (0.000)  (0.814) 
LNTA               -0.181 0.517 -0.520                    0.168 0.809 -0.101 
 
              (0.324)  (0.321) (0.112)                   (0.261)  (0.502) (0.106) 
CAPITAL               0.935***  -0.786*      0.962***                   0.935***  0.0998      0.848*** 
 
              (0.000)  (0.10) (0.001)                   (0.000)  (0.109) (0.001) 
LOANSTA               0.6210** -0.0692 -0.0759                   0.0468** -0.0350  -0.00963 
 
              (0.02) (0.230) (0.168)                    (0.02)  (0.417) (0.156) 
 MACGDP               0.364*** -0.0591  0.0542*                   0.102*** - 0.0335   0.0143* 
 
              (0.001)  (0.264)                        (0.10)                   (0.001)  (0.293)                  (0.10) 
FOREIGN               0.0981 0.0945      0.0631***                   0.00990 0.0385        0.0221*** 
 
             (0.210) (0.120) (0.001)                   (0.198) (0.305) (0.002) 
BS              -0.0156 -0.521* 0.0196                  -0.0149 -0.177*   0.00131 
 
             (0.321) (0.10) (0.320)                   (0.476) (0.10) (0.252) 
EXPER              0.0754*         -1.417                    0.754                   0.0307             -1.012             0.8971 
 
             (0.10) 
       (0.104)                (0.120)                   (0.287)            (0.152)          (0.275) 
FEMALE              0.00296 0.0961                        0.0875**                   0.00159   -0.102**      0.0259** 
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              (0.411) (0.136)                       (0.05)                   (0.191) (0.005)  (0.05) 
COMPENSATION              0.0547 -0.00857                      0.00981                   0.06051* 0.0876   -0.00315 
 
             (0.178) (0.326)                      (1.751)                   (0.10) (0.334)   (1.693) 
Constant               2.243*** -2.953* 2.158***                    3.243 -3.953*      2.292*** 
 
             (0.000) (0.10)                      (0.000)                   (0.123) (0.10)                  (0.000) 
Observations                   280   268              254 250   232  244 
Adjusted R2                  0.291       0.234             0.236 0.279            0.214          0.298 
N. of banks                   70   69                        68 69   69   67 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank risk (RISK) which measured by Z-Score, NPL and Tier1-Capital. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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4.6 Exploring the Global Financial Crisis  
In this section, we examine how the global financial crisis (GFC) affects the impact of economic 
freedom and regulation of credit, labor and business market on bank performance and risk-taking. To 
address this issue, we add interaction terms to our regression models. The models, described by 
equations 4a and 4b below, are estimated using the Fixed-Effects method. 
Bank performance model 
(PERFOR)i,t=β
0
+β
1
CRISIS*EC-FRi,t+β
2
CRISIS*CR-REGi,t+β
3
CRISIS*LB-REGi,t+β
4
CRISIS*BS-
REGi,t+β
5
LNTAi,t+β
6
CAPITALi,+β
7
LOANSTAi,t+β
8
GDPi,t+β
9
INFi,t+β
10
MACGDPi,t+β
11
FOREIG
Ni,t+β
12
BSi,t+β
13
EXPERi,t+β
14
FEMALEi,t+β
15
COMPENSATIONi,+ ui + εi,t (4a) 
Bank risk model 
(RISK)i,t=β
0
+β
1
CRISIS*EC-FRi,t+β
2
CRISIS*CR-REGi,t+β
3
CRISIS*LB-REGi,t+β
4
CRISIS*BS-
REGi,t+β
5
LNTAi,t+β
6
CAPITALi,+β
7
LOANSTAi,t+β
8
GDPi,t+β
9
INFi,t+β
10
MACGDPi,t+β
11
FOREIG
Ni,t+β
12
BSi,t+β
13
EXPERi,t+β
14
FEMALEi,t+β
15
COMPENSATIONi,+ ui + εi,t (4b) 
Where PERFOR and RISK denote performance and risk-taking respectively for bank i, t the time 
period, ln the natural logarithmic, β the parameters to be estimated, u the unobserved fixed-effect for 
bank i and ε the remaining disturbance term. We consider the dummy variable CRISIS which takes 
the value one for the period 2004 to 2009 and the value zero for the period 2010 to 2016.  
According to the results of Tables 13 and 14 the negative coefficient of the CRISIS*(REG) variable 
means that the effect of economic freedom and regulation of private, labor and business market is 
more pronounced for the period after the financial crisis (Wooldridge, 2012). 
The effect of the economic freedom variable is positive and significant on the return on average 
assets (ROAA) at the 5% level which means that a high degree of economic freedom is linked to 
better economic growth and thus, to better bank performance (Table 13). Our results are consistent 
with those of Sufian Hassan (2010) and Sufian and Majid (2011) among others, providing support 
for hypothesis H1.a. Also, the CRISIS*(EC-FR) variable is negative at the 1% level for net interest 
margin, meaning that after the financial crisis the linkage is more important. Our results are not the 
same with those in Table 11 as we find that the effect of economic freedom on bank performance has 
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no significant impact regardless of the risk measure for the period after the crisis. Similarly, the 
effect of economic freedom on return on average assets (ROAA) is more pronounced for the period 
after the crisis. However, the positive coefficient of the economic freedom CRISIS*(EC-FR) variable 
means that a low value in economic freedom increases bank performance when measured by return 
on average assets (ROAE), for the period before and during the financial crisis. Thus, we accept 
hypothesis H3.a.  
In addition, the positive impact of the economic freedom (EC-FR) variable on Tier1-capital ratio 
(Table 14) means that greater levels of economic freedom increase competition and growth 
development and hence, contribute to financial stability, rendering support to hypothesis H1.d. Also, 
the positive impact of the CRISIS*(EC-FR) variable on Tier1-capital ratio shows that the effect of 
economic freedom is more significant for the period after the global financial crisis. Thus, we reject 
hypothesis H3.b.  Our results are not the same with those in Table 12 as we find that the impact of 
economic freedom on risk-taking is negative and significant for Tier1-capital for the period after the 
crisis.  
Moreover, in Table 13, the relationship between the credit regulation and bank performance is 
positive and significant at the 1% level for return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average 
equity (ROAE). Our findings are in line with Chortareas et al. (2013) who show that financial 
freedom has as positive impact on bank efficiency, providing support for hypothesis H2.1.a. Also, 
the CRISIS*(CR-REG) variable is negative at the 1% level for return on average assets (ROAA), 
meaning that after the crisis the linkage is more important. Regarding the risk-taking the credit 
regulation has no significant impact on bank risk. Thus, we reject both hypotheses H2.1.c. and 
H2.2.d.  
Form Table 13, the impact of the labor regulation on bank performance is positive and significant at 
the 1% level for Tobin’sQ and for net interest margin (NIM). One possible explanation is that 
minimising business start-up regulations and reducing the time and cost required for firm registration 
are all found to increase the number of new businesses and jobs created and thus, result in increased 
bank performance (Mamatzakis et al., 2013). Hence, we accept hypothesis H2.2.a. Moreover, the 
negative effect of the CRISIS*(LB-REG) variable on bank performance and especially on Tobin’sQ 
and return on average equity (ROAE) is negative at the 1% level, means that the impact of liberal 
labor regulation is more important for the period after the financial crisis. Our results are similar with 
those from the Table 11 as we show that the relationship between labor regulation and bank 
performance is positive for the period after the crisis only when measured by Tobin’sQ. 
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Also, the effect of labor regulation on risk-taking is negative for non-performing loans (NPL) at the 
5% level but positive for Z-Score and Tier1-capital at different levels (Table 14) rendering support to 
hypothesis H2.2.d. This means that liberal labor regulation reduces bank risk-taking. One possible 
explanation for this result is that increasing the flexibility of the labor market increases both the 
employment rate and the rate of participation in the labor force and hence, lead to a reduction in bank 
risk. Moreover, the impact of the CRISIS*(LB-REG) on risk-taking is positive and significant for 
non-performing loans (NPL) and Z-Score at the 1% level but negative at the same level for Tier1-
capital, meaning that labor regulation is significant for bank risk for the whole period (Table 14). 
Hence, we reject hypothesis H3.b. Our results are in line with those from Table 12 where we show 
that liberal labor regulation increases bank risk-taking for the period 2004-2016. 
Furthermore, regarding the business regulation variable we find that it has a positive and significant 
impact on bank performance at the 1% level for any measure (Table 13) and, hence, we accept 
hypothesis H2.3.a. One possible explanation is that business economic freedom is associated with 
more job creation which leads to increased bank performance (Mamatzakis et al., 2013). Also, the 
coefficient of the CRISIS*(BS-REG) variable is positive at the 1% level for return on average equity 
(ROAE) but negative at the 1% for the other proxies, meaning that the impact of business regulation 
on bank performance is significant for the whole period.  
Also, we find that business regulation has a greater influence on bank risk after the financial crisis as 
the coefficient of CRISIS*(BS-REG) is negative and significant at the 1% level for both non-
performing loans (NPL) and Tier1-capital. Thus we reject hypothesis H3.b. Moreover, Table 14 
indicates that business regulation has no significant impact on risk-taking regardless of risk measure. 
Our results are not similar with those in Table 12, as we find that the liberal business regulation 
reduces bank risk-taking for the period after the financial crisis (2010-2016). 
 
Table 13: Empirical results for bank performance with interactions  
Variables          Tobin’sQ ROAA ROAE NIM 
 
EC-FR 
 
           0.0754 
 
   0.875 
 
     -0.058 
 
0.425** 
            (0.132)            (0.230)    (0.196)     (0.05) 
CR-REG           -0.0235 
   0.0354***    0.0721***     0.0874 
            (0.223)           (0.000)            (0.000)     (0.211) 
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LB-REG 
           0.0398***           -0.547    0.0245    0.0122*** 
            (0.001)           (0.162)    (0.411)     (0.001) 
BS-REG 
           0.0526***    0.745***           0.063***   0.0963*** 
             (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.001)          (0.001) 
LNTA 
         -0.7852***    -0.0987***   -0.411    0.0695 
            (0.000)   (0.001)           (0.591)    (0.245) 
 CAPITAL 
           0.0981**    0.0612 
          0.0876** 0.0396*** 
            (0.04)            (0.469)           (0.05)    (0.001) 
LOANSTA 
          -0.0963***     0.482***   0.0410*** -0.0563*** 
           (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.001) 
GDP           0.0158 
    0.891***     0.248***          0.4526 
            (0.126)           (0.001)  (0.001)          (0.289) 
INF 
         -0.0423***           0.0574           -0.213 -0.0396** 
            (0.001)            (0.198) (0.156)          (0.001) 
MACGDP 
         -0.826***   -0.256***     -0.378***         -0.0274 
           (0.000)           (0.001) (0.001)          (0.312) 
FOREIGN           0.0789 -0.00741           -0.496 
         0.962** 
           (0.209)           (0.313)           (0.195)          (0.05) 
CRISIS*(EC-FR)           -1.120 -0.652***    0.963***         -0.453*** 
           (0.120)          (0.000)           (0.000)          (0.001) 
CRISIS*(CR-REG)          -1.089 -0.503***          -0.789         -0.456 
          (0.315)          (0.000)          (0.234)         (0.120) 
CRISIS*(LB-REG) 
         -0.897***           0.6891   -1.012***         -1.164 
          (0.000)          (0.112)           (0.000)         (0.189) 
CRISIS*(BS-REG) 
         -1.123*** -0.962***  0.814***         -0.789*** 
          (0.000)          (0.000)           (0.000)          (0.001) 
BS           0.0521 
   0.1485***     0.0963***          0.0126 
 
         (0.620)  (0.001)     (0.001)    (0.175) 
EXPER 
         -0.891 
 0.0521**         0.0782**  0.0412*** 
 
         (0.120)  (0.05)          (0.05)    (0.001) 
FEMALE 
         0.0762** 0.0856           0.4785 0.0621** 
 
         (0.054) (0.212)          (0.278)     (0.05) 
COMPENSATION 
           0.00812 0.0693*          0.0076*     0.01025 
 
           (0.175) (0.10)          (0.10)    (0.189) 
Constant 
           2.859*** 1.079*** -1.781***         -1.896*** 
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            (0.000)          (0.000)           (0.000)           (0.000) 
  Observations              657            625             636             627 
  N. of Banks              75             73             74              73 
  Adjusted R2            0.289          0.221          0.263            0.302 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank 
performance (PERFOR) which measured by Tobin’sQ, ROAA, ROAE and NIM. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-
values are reported in parentheses.  
 
Table 14: Empirical results for bank risk with interactions  
Variables Z-Score NPL Tier1-Capital 
 
EC-FR 
 
0.0268 
 
-0.0785 
 
0.0891* 
 (0.201) (0.296)                 (0.10) 
CR-REG -0.0963  0.0456                -0.0147 
 (0.364) (0.245)                 (0.269) 
LB-REG 0.0896* -0.312**                 0.126*** 
                  (0.10) (0.05) (0.001) 
BS-REG 0.0852 0.0245                 0.0618 
 (0.187) (0.169)                 (0.378) 
LNTA 
 0.0278*     0.296***      0.0281*** 
                 (0.10)                 (0.000)                 (0.002) 
 CAPITAL -1.120**                  0.9872                -0.478 
                 (0.05)                 (0.126)                 (0.320) 
LOANSTA 0.0756 -0.0047                 0.0784* 
 (0.210) (0.420)                 (0.10) 
GDP                 -0.374 
 -1.077***  1.012*** 
 (0.104) (0.002)                (0.000) 
INF 
  -0.891***   0.786***               -0.821 
                 (0.001)                 (0.001)                (0.423) 
MACGDP 
  0.775*** -0.469***                0.821*  
                 (0.000)                 (0.001)                (0.10) 
FOREIGN 
   -0.0373***  -0.793*** -0.698*** 
                 (0.001)                (0.001)                (0.000) 
CRISIS*(EC-FR) 
                1.013***                 0.478                0.978*** 
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                (0.000)               (0.120)               (0.001) 
CRISIS*(CR-REG)               -0.8131              -0.7561               0.6541 
                (0.436)               (0.489)               (0.355) 
CRISIS*(LB-REG)                0.7853 
              0.697***              -0.978*** 
                (0.134)               (0.000)              (0.001) 
CRISIS*(BS-REG)                -0.846 
             -0.478***              -0.821*** 
                (0.245)              (0.000)              (0.000) 
BS 
 -0.451***              0.364***             -0.7218 
                (0.000)              (0.001)              (0.125) 
EXPER 
 0.624***             -0.7841              0.821* 
                (0.001)              (0.458)              (0.10) 
FEMALE               -0.2471 
            -0.503***             -0.631* 
                (0.125)              (0.000)               (0.10) 
COMPENSATION 
  0.0074***             -0.0089***              0.0689*** 
                (0.001)              (0.001)              (0.001) 
Constant 
               1.891***              2.079***             -2.594*** 
                (0.000)              (0.000)              (0.001) 
Observations                 696                657                708 
N. of Banks                  74                73                 74 
Adjusted R2                0.287              0.320               0.246 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank risk 
(RISK) which measured by Z-Score, NPL and Tier1-Capital. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. 
Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
4.7 Empirical results by groups of countries 
In order to examine for any region specific differences concerning the effect of economic freedom 
and regulation of credit, labor and business on bank performance and risk-taking, we divide our 
sample in three groups of countries based on their geographic location. Group A consists of countries 
of Southern Europe such as Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal. Group B consists of countries of 
Northern Europe such as Ireland, UK, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Group C consists of countries 
of Central Europe such as Germany, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, Hungary, 
Poland and Czech Republic.  
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Based on the results of Table 15, the effect of economic freedom (EC-FR) is positively related to 
bank performance for countries in Group A and Group B regardless of how it is measured in 
different significance levels. Thus, we accept hypothesis H1.a. One possible explanation is that 
economic freedom improves innovation and entrepreneurship and hence, has a positive impact on 
bank performance. However, economic freedom is positive for countries of Group C which means 
that a high degree of economic freedom leads to high levels of bank performance. Although, the 
coefficient of economic freedom has no statistically significant impact and thus, it does not affect 
bank performance in the countries of Central Europe. Moreover, the effect of economic freedom on 
bank risk is positive for Z-Score and Tier1-capital ratio meaning that high levels of economic 
freedom reduce bank risk (Table 16). However, the results are mixed for Group B relatively to the 
measure of risk-taking while the effect of economic freedom is not significant for Group C. Hence, 
we accept both hypotheses H1.c and H1.d. 
Concerning the impact of credit regulation (CR-REG) on bank performance, the results are 
inconclusive for both Group A and Group B. Also, the effect is positive and significant at the 10% 
level for return on average equity (ROAE) for Central Europe countries (Table 15). Moreover, the 
estimated coefficient of credit regulation is positive and significant at the 1% level for non-
performing loans for countries of Group A. This means that liberal credit regulation increases credit 
risk (Table 16), rendering support to hypothesis H2.1.c. One possible explanation is that in 
developing countries where there are high levels of corruption banks lend more to less creditworthy 
companies. However, the effect of credit regulation on risk-taking is negative at the 1% level for 
non-performing loans in Group B and positive at the 10% level for Tier1-capital in Group C, 
meaning that stricter credit regulation increases credit risk. Thus, we accept hypothesis H2.1.d.  
The relationship between the labor regulation variable (LB-REG) and bank performance is negative 
at different levels for countries of Group A. This means that stricter labor regulation increases bank 
performance in developing countries. However, the impact of labor regulation is positive for 
countries of Group B. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient of economic freedom is negative but 
has no significant impact for countries of Group C (Table 15). Hence, we accept both hypotheses 
H2.2.a and H2.2.b. One possible explanation is that employees tend to invest more in skills when 
they perceive a high risk of losing their jobs because of the absence of employment protection 
(Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzaskis, 2013). The effect of labor regulation (LB-REG) on bank 
risk is negative (reduces) and significant at different levels for countries of Group B and C (Table 
16). More precisely, we find that liberal labor regulation reduces risk-taking and probability of 
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default for Southern and Northern Europe countries. One possible explanation is that liberal labor 
regulation turn in better bank performance and hence, reduces risk-taking with respect to innovation 
and technology (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002; Scarpetta and Tressel, 2004). Thus, we accept 
hypotheses H2.2.c and H2.2.d. However, the estimated coefficient of labor regulation indicates that 
stricter labor regulation reduces the probability of default while increases the non-performing loans 
ratio. Nevertheless, labor regulation has no significant impact on countries of Group A.  
The results concerning the business regulation (BS-REG) variable are mixed (Table 15); positive for 
return on average equity (ROAE) but negative for the other proxies at different levels, rendering 
support to hypotheses H2.3.a and H2.3.b. However, the impact of business regulation is positive at 
the 5% level for Tobin’sQ in Northern Europe countries. One possible explanation is that in a good 
economy less business regulation promotes business creation which in turn increases profits for 
banks and, hence leads to high levels of performance (Sufian and Habibullah, 2010). On the 
contrary, the impact of business regulation on bank performance is negative and significant at the 5% 
level for return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity (ROAE) for countries of 
Croup C.  
Therefore, the impact of business regulation (BS-REG) on bank risk is negatively (reduces) and 
statistically significant for countries of Southern Europe. This means that liberal business regulation 
leads to less credit risk and thus we accept hypothesis H2.3.d. One possible explanation is that less 
restrictions and entry barriers may lead to more businesses which turn in increased demand for 
financial services and hence lead to more revenues for banks and less risk. However, the effect is 
positive (increases) for countries of Group B and Group C as more liberal business regulation is 
associated with more credit risk (Table 16). Thus, we accept hypothesis H2.3.c. 
According to the GDP growth (GDP) the effect on bank performance is positive and significant at 
different levels regardless of bank’s location. One possible explanation is that a soundly managed 
bank would profit from loans and securities sale (Sufian and Habibullah, 2010). Therefore, the 
findings concerning risk-taking indicate that the GDP growth reduces credit risk only for Northern 
Europe countries. The GDP growth has no significant impact for the countries of Group A and 
Group C. 
Regarding the inflation (INF) variable the effect on bank performance is negative for countries of 
Group A and Group C. Therefore, the findings concerning risk-taking indicate that inflation 
increases bank risk-taking at different levels regardless of bank’s location. One possible explanation 
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is that an unexpected rise in inflation causes cash flow difficulties for borrowers that may lead to 
premature termination of loan arrangements and precipitate loan losses (Perry, 1992). 
With regard to the control variables, the estimated coefficient of size (LNTA) on bank performance 
is negative and significant at different levels, for countries of Group B and Group C regardless of 
how performance is measured (Table 15). Regarding risk-taking we find in Table 16 that bank size 
reduces probability of default in Southern and Northern Europe countries. Nevertheless, regarding 
the countries of Central Europe (Group C) we find the opposite effect: smaller banks may enjoy 
economies of scale and tend to be more efficient.  
Our results show a positive relationship between tighter capital regulation (CAPITAL) and bank 
performance for Groups A and B and negative for Group C. Better capitalized banks have stronger 
incentives in improving their performance and minimizing costs. Also, the capital adequacy ratio 
(CAPITAL) reduces bank risk for all Groups of countries. The estimated coefficient of loans to total 
assets (LOANSTA) on bank performance is negative and significant at different levels, for countries 
of Group B and Group C regardless of how performance is measured (Table 15). Nevertheless, 
regarding the countries of Southern Europe (Group A) we find the opposite effect: asset utilization 
increase bank performance in developing countries when used efficiently. Regarding risk-taking we 
find in Table 16 that asset utilization reduces credit risk and contribute to bank stability regardless of 
bank’s location. 
Moreover, our findings indicate that there is a positive relationship between stock market 
capitalization (MACGDP) and bank performance for Group A but a negative for Group C. The 
results are mixed for Group B. In well-developed stock markets, companies tend to rely on equity 
rather than bank finance (Pasiouras et al., 2009). Regarding risk-taking we find in Table 16 that stock 
market capitalization increases probability of default in Southern and Northern Europe countries. 
Nevertheless, regarding the countries of Central Europe (Group C) we find the opposite effect; stock 
market capitalization improves bank stability and decreases credit risk. 
Furthermore, the impact of the presence of foreign (FOREIGN) on bank performance is positive and 
significant at different levels for countries of Group A and Group C. one possible explanation is that 
banks in concentrated markets may be able to offer lower deposit rates and charge higher loan rates 
(Ataullah and Le; 2006) However, the results are mixed for countries of Group B (Table 15). 
Concerning risk-taking, the presence of foreign banks reduces bank risk regardless of bank’s location 
(Table 16).   
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Based on the results of Table 15, the effect of board size (BS) is negatively related to bank 
performance for countries in Group A and positively related for countries in Group B regardless of 
how it is measured in different significance levels. Our findings indicate that large boards of 
directors perform worse than smaller ones in developing countries as they are more quick in the 
decision-making process (Hogue and Muradoglu, 2010; Belhaj and Mateus, 2016). However, the 
board size variable has no significant impact for countries of Group C (Table 15).  
Also, the coefficient of board size (BS) is significant for all risk measures and for all Groups (Table 
16). More precisely, the effect of board size (BS) on bank risk is negative for Southern and Central 
Europe countries and positive for Northern Europe countries. Our findings reveal that 
macroeconomic factors in conjunction with regulation of countries may alter the impact of board size 
on risk-taking. More precisely, in developing countries where corruption is high it is beneficial for 
bank to have small boards as the latter are more easy to monitor and to come to a common decision 
quickly.  
The effect of financial experience is positively and significantly related with bank performance at 
different levels regardless of bank’s location (Table 15). More experienced directors may lead to 
beneficial decisions for the bank. Nevertheless, the findings concerning the coefficient of financial 
experience on risk-taking show that financial experience reduces credit risk for Southern and 
Northern Europe countries while it has no significant impact for Central Europe countries. 
Consequently, the implementation of macroeconomic factors changes the impact of financial 
experience on bank risk. One possible explanation is that in developing countries wage pressures 
could result in higher labor productivity due to investment in capital-intensive industries (Autor et 
al., 2007). 
The relationship between the female directors and bank performance is positive for countries of 
Group A and Group C but there is no significant impact for countries of Group B (Table 15). Our 
findings indicate that there is a positive relationship between women and bank performance. One 
possible explanation for this result is that women may contribute to the effectiveness of the board 
due to their specific skills and knowledge (García-Meca et al., 2015). The effect of women directors 
(FEMALE) on bank risk is significant at different levels. We find mixed results for Southern and 
Central Europe countries. Hence, the presence of women for Northern Europe countries has no 
significant impact on risk-taking.  
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Also, the estimated coefficient of compensation has no significant effect on bank performance 
measures for countries of Group A and Group C but positive and significant at the 1% level for 
countries belonging to Group B. Therefore, the impact of compensation on bank risk is positive and 
statistically significant for countries of Southern Europe and Northern Europe. However, the effect is 
not significant for countries of Central Europe. Our results show that an increase in CEO cash 
bonuses in European banks leads to lower risk (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013). 
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Table 15: Empirical results for bank performance by Group of Countries 
Group A Group B Group C 
Variables     Tobin’sQ    ROAA ROAE NIM            Tobin’sQ ROAA     ROAE         NIM        Tobin’sQ         ROAA ROAE NIM 
 
EC-FR 
 
               0.00930*** 
 
       0.4391 
 
   0.2731** 
 
           0.093*** 
 
              0.0154* 
 
0.0970*** 
 
       0.6671 
 
0.0223* 
 
             0.0309 
 
  0.0470 
 
0.3671 
 
  0.189 
 (0.000)      (0.234) (0.05)  (0.000)               (0.10) (0.000)       (0.182) (0.10)              (0.143) (0.169) (0.188)  (0.139) 
CR-REG   -0.0117**     0.389*** 2.947 -0.0117** -0.0125 -0.158***        5.811** 0.0412**    0.00986 0.126  0.563* 0.0393 
 
               (0.05) (0.000) (0.215) (0.05) (0.217) (0.000)             (0.05) (0.05) (0.118) (0.936) (0.10) (0.716) 
LB-REG               -0.00736  -0.329** -0.3524* -0.00736 -0.0203 0.110***             0.864 -0.00118 -0.00240 -0.00192 -0.988 0.0603 
 
(0.547) (0.000) (0.881) (0.500) (0.317) (0.000)             (0.437) (0.141) (0.644) (0.535) (0.172) (0.431) 
BS-REG   -0.0245***    -0.552***     0.7582***  -0.0245***    0.0663** 0.00421             -5.545 -0.00128 -0.00383 -0.162**  -0.792** -0.0600 
 
              (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)         (0.001) (0.05) (0.449)     (4.014) (0.156) (0.125)        (0.10) (0.05) (0.210) 
  GDP    0.00419*** 
            0.0950**    0.206***    0.0419*** -0.00234        0.00261*       0.940**   0.0075 0.00214     0.0716***    1.090***   0.0091 
 
              (0.001) 
      (0.05) (0.000)          (0.001) (0.341) (0.10)  (0.05)   (0.348) (0.185) (0.001) (0.000)    (0.212) 
INF    -0.00659*** 
            -0.134* -1.775*   -0.0659***  -0.0109**        0.00137***        0.059***   0.00026 -0.00737*   -0.0746** -0.297**   0.0024 
 
               (0.001) 
      (0.10) (0.10) (0.001) (0.05) (0.002)   (0.000)   (0.192)            (0.10)        (0.05) (0.05)    (0.354) 
LNTA 0.00199 0.0454 1.308 0.00199 -0.0176** 0.250     -2.408** -0.419***   -0.0197***  -0.172***    -1.669*** -0.372*** 
 
(0.511)   (0.0973) (1.404) (0.511)             (0.05) (0.299) (0.10) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAPITAL 0.151      0.150***    1.467*** 0.00151   0.0869*** -0.0165       1.601*** -0.0109*           -0.00926 0.00510   0.0797***   0.0202* 
 
(0.118)             (0.003) (0.000) (0.118) (0.001) (0.168) (0.000) (0.10)             (0.136) (0.108) (0.000) (0.10) 
LOANSTA -0.00170    0.0239**     0.414*** -0.0170 
            -1.647** -1.915***             -1.071*** -0.334***            -0.540*** -0.00191 -0.0929** -0.0888** 
 
(0.488) (0.05) (0.000) (0.488) 
              (0.05) (0.000)       (0.000) (0.000)             (0.000) (0.343)        (0.05)        (0.05) 
MACGDP 0.0212***        0.0596  0.0514***   0.0693**    0.0212*** -0.964***     0.185** -0.793*** 0.00121 0.00405 0.00328   -0.0619*** 
 (0.000)      (0.113) (0.001)  (0.05) (0.001) (0.000) (0.05)        (0.000) (0.324) (0.267) (0.441)       (0.001) 
FOREIGN -0.1451 
       0.2451**   0.316***   0.0723 0.00259 -1.964*** 0.0321 0.7893*** -0.00109      0.0128*** 0.0673 0.0117** 
 (0.131)       (0.05) (0.001)          (0.144) (0.776) (0.000) (0.197) (0.000) (0.711) (0.000) (0.615)       (0.05) 
BS -0.00152* -0.00195 -0.201 -0.00152* -0.00246 
 0.9645*** 0.433  1.334*** -0.00367 -0.0379 0.738 0.0262 
 
              (0.10) (0.179) (0.258)          (0.10) (0.374) (0.000) (0.492) (0.000) (0.862) (0.736) (0.243) (0.207) 
EXPER -0.00350      0.0793***    0.884** -0.000350 -0.00573 
 0.196*** 0.190 -0.3341 -0.00368 0.00174 0.674* 0.0258 
 
(0.111) (0.000) (0.000) (0.111) (0.355) (0.000) (0.458) (0.235) (0.225) (0.196) (0.10) (0.157) 
FEMALE  -0.00842**   0.0375**   0.0448** -0.00842** 0.08305 -0.986*** -0.167* -0.734*** -0.00142 0.00359 0.0627  0.0789** 
 
(0.400) (0.001)         (0.05)          (0.05) (0.703) (0.000)            (0.10) (0.000) (0.476) (0.417) (0.756)         (0.05) 
COMPENSATION 0.001250 0.7781 0.00136         0.1257      0.0974*** 0.0960*** -0.00288 0.334*** 0.0155 0.0292 0.00698 -0.3510 
 
(0.250) (0.196) (0.114)          (0.256) (0.001) (0.000) (0.296) (0.001) (0.321) (0.281) (0.474) (0.230) 
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Constant       1.095*** -2.073* -2.247*** -0.296 -1.242** 1.781***       0.875*** 1.977*** 0.233**  1.926*** 1.071*** 0.775*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.10) (0.000) (0.188) (0.05) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.05) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations      197   219           243    234                 198         170                170 150              245 261 259 275 
  Adjusted R2     0.211     0.265         0.291             0.285               0.348        0.273      0.188 0.245             0.134 0.235 0.198   0.212 
N. of Banks       25      25  23     23                  22 22   22 22                30           30          30 30 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank performance (PERFOR) which measured by Tobin’sQ, ROAA, ROAE and NIM. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 16: Empirical results for bank risk by Group of Countries 
Group A Group B Group C 
Variables Z-Score NPL   Tier1-Capital Z-Score       NPL Tier1- Capital Z-Score NPL    Tier1-Capital 
 
EC-FR 
 
              0.5372*** 
 
      -0.0891 
 
      1.0867*** 
 
           0.6142*** 
 
 3.321** 
 
      -0.1935 
 
                 -0.517 
 
     -1.0186 
 
      0.8192 
 (0.000)     (0.145)            (0.001)            (0.001)        (0.04)     (0.179) (0.623)     (0.129)      (0.118) 
CR-REG 0.254    0.978*** 0.131 0.361       -0.4402*** 0.242 -0.118 0.292 0.587* 
 
(0.309) (0.000) (0.139) (0.214) (0.001) (0.377) (0.198)   (0.528) (0.10) 
LB-REG -0.415 -0.672 0.0351   0.961**    -0.4577**    1.229*** 0.0549*      -0.915***      0.523*** 
 
(0.307) (0.654) (0.140) (0.04) (0.10) (0.001) (0.10)   (0.000) (0.000) 
BS-REG     0.425***     -0.857*** 0.790***           0.5762       0.651*** -0.0287 0.189   0.744* -0.128 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.210) (0.000) (0.596) (0.148) (0.10) (0.281) 
 GDP 0.0868 0.105 0.00862 0.0868   -0.549*** 0.123* 0.0365 -0.0203 -0.0547 
 
(0.762) (0.146) (0.340) (0.235) (0.000) (0.10) (0.283) (0.726) (0.564) 
 INF -0.302**      1.333*** -0.233*** -0.302**  0.532** -0.139* 0.0779   0.473*** 0.103 
 
(0.05) (0.001) (0.000) (0.05)           (0.04) (0.08) (0.583) (0.000) (0.120) 
LNTA   1.164*** -1.142* -0.453   0.9783 0.921 1.532*** -0.486*** 0.320 -0.0188 
 
(0.000) (0.621) (0.127) (0.137) (0.694) 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.440) (0.153) 
CAPITAL   1.030*** -0.00827   0.815***   1.030***     -1.043***      0.987*** 0.848***     -0.284***    0.847*** 
 
(0.001) (0.141)           (0.001) (0.001) (0.208) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LOANSTA    0.0899***  -0.164*** 0.0206*    0.0920*** -0.2481 -0.120 -0.00810 -0.0191 -0.0202 
 
           (0.001)          (0.001)           (0.10)            (0.000) (1.899) (1.233) (0.862) (0.253) (0.131) 
 MACGDP 
            -0.789***     0.8750 -0.685***             -0.437 0.909** -0.0193 0.240*** -0.0361** 0.0143 
              (0.000)    (0.126)            (0.001)              (0.360) (0.03) (0.124) (0.001) (0.05) (0.245) 
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 FOREIGN 
              0.5960***      0.7831   0.436***             0.5960*** 0.0246 -0.00421 0.0198*    -0.0853*** 0.0197 
 (0.000)     (0.196) (0.001)            (0.000) (0.470) (0.135)                 (0.10) (0.000) (0.152) 
 BS   -0.145*** 0.0469 0.0325  0.278*** -0.505* 0.174** -0.0940    0.523*** -0.302 
 
(0.001) (0.101) (0.218) (0.001) (0.10)           (0.05) (0.148) (0.366) (0.281) 
 EXPER   0.181*** -0.251** 0.0283   0.493*** -0.302 0.00469 0.0442 -0.0837 0.0337 
 
(0.000) (0.05) (0.276) (0.001) (0.216) (0.670) (0.383) (0.111) (0.748) 
 FEMALE 0.0593**   0.231*** 0.00920 0.0593 0.0192 -0.0180 -0.00555      0.0808***  0.0358** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.122) (0.349) (0.432) (0.137) (0.802) (0.0223) (0.05) 
COMPENSATION     0.00432*** -0.00919 0.00134*     0.00811*** 0.00161 -0.00368 -0.00356 -0.00971 -0.00292 
 
(0.001) (0.120) (0.08) (0.000) (0.166) (0.500) (0.561) (0.139) (0.104) 
Constant  -1.763***   1.808*** 1.085**    1.920*** -0.7895*** 1.774*** 1.190** 0.338 1.014*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.04) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.05) (0.139) (0.000) 
Observations 243   228            263               124   148   151                   234   175       234 
 Adjusted R2               0.228    0.237         0.245               0.272     0.275      0.318                  0.279    0.317      0.301 
N. of Banks   27   27        27   25             14   14                     25             21        26 
Note: This table reports regression results obtained via the Fixed-Effects method. The dependent variable is bank risk (RISK) which measured by Z-Score, NPL and Tier1-Capital. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this essay, we examined the impact of economic freedom and regulation of credit, labor and 
business market on bank performance and bank stability in a sample of 75 European commercial 
banks for the period from 2004 to 2016. To our knowledge, this is the first study which relates 
corporate governance variables with regulation and economic freedom and control for any changes 
in the impact of bank governance on bank performance and risk-taking while we employ 
macroeconomic factors.  
The empirical findings provide answers to our main research questions while they reveal a number of 
critical issues as regards the impact of macroeconomic variables on corporate governance 
mechanisms. Overall, our results show that economic freedom increases bank performance in many 
cases. This means that a high degree of economic freedom is associated with high levels of bank 
performance. One possible explanation for this result is that economic freedom promotes innovation 
and entrepreneurship, and hence, leads to economic growth and to better banking performance. 
Regarding the risk-taking of banks, our findings indicate that economic freedom contributes to 
financial system soundness. One possible explanation is that more economic freedom is associated 
with a lower probability of default due to high competition and economic growth. However, the 
impact of economic freedom on bank risk changes depending on the time period and the location. 
Moreover, credit regulation has a positive and statistically significant impact on bank performance, 
supporting that more liberal credit regulation improves the profitability of banks. One possible 
explanation is that liberal credit regulation resulted in fewer restrictions on banking activities and 
hence, allows banks to exploit the economies of scale. Furthermore, the results regarding risk taking 
are mixed depending on the risk measure, the time period and the location.  
In addition, the impact of labor market regulation on bank performance is positive, meaning that 
liberal labor regulation increases the profitability of banks. One possible explanation is that liberal 
labor regulation promotes competition and thus, leads to high levels of bank efficiency. Also, the 
impact of labor regulation is negative on risk-taking. A possible explanation is that liberal labor 
regulation contributes to better bank performance and hence, reduces risk-taking with respect to 
innovation and technology.  
Furthermore, business regulation increases bank performance, meaning that liberal business 
regulation enhances bank profitability through the increased competition and increased growth. 
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However, our results change when we consider the location of banks. Regarding the risk-taking of 
banks, our findings indicate that stricter business regulation contributes to more risk. Business 
regulation and entry barriers lead to less revenues from new businesses, decreased productivity and 
hence, result in less gains for banks and in more risk-taking. 
Sound corporate governance is associated with less need for monitoring and supervision and less 
bank controls. Our findings reveal that the implementation of macroeconomic variables alters the 
impact of bank governance on bank performance and risk-taking in some cases. More precisely, the 
results regarding the impact of board size on bank performance and risk-taking are mixed and similar 
with those in the first essay, in the majority of the tests. However, in the two-step system GMM 
model our results are not the same with those in the first essay. More precisely, we find that a large 
board increases the probability of default. One possible explanation is that a liberal economic 
environment in conjunction with less credit regulation might give the opportunity to board members 
to take more risks and hence, to increase the likelihood of default risk.  
Moreover, the impact of financial experience on bank performance and risk-taking does not change 
in many cases. The results reveal that experienced directors are associated with more bank 
performance and less risk-taking. One possible explanation for this result is that a more experienced 
board can identify risks that will affect financial stability and, hence, can advise managers on how to 
handle these risks to avoid losses. However, our results change when we take into account the 
location of banks. More precisely, we show that the impact of financial experience is more 
significant in developing countries as it reduces credit risk and probability of default. One possible 
explanation is that in developing countries wage pressures could result in higher labor productivity 
due to investment in capital-intensive industries.  
Concerning the impact of female directors on bank performance we find that female directors 
increase bank performance. One possible explanation is that women contribute to board effectiveness 
through their knowledge and skills. However, regarding the risk-taking of banks the results are not 
the same with those in first essay, when we apply the two-step system GMM. More precisely, we 
find that female directors reduce credit risk. One possible explanation is that in a liberal labor 
environment the presence of women tends to be high. This in turn, leads to less credit risk as women 
are considered to be less overconfident than men, and thus, avoid taking more risks. 
Finally, the compensation of directors increase bank performance and reduces risk-taking. Our 
results reveal that when the performance achievements concern long-term investments then the 
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payment tends to be higher. However, regarding the risk-taking of banks the results differ for those 
in the first essay, when we apply the two-step system GMM. More precisely, we show that 
compensation contributes to financial stability. One possible explanation is that in a more liberal and 
competitive environment, directors are more willing to invest in positive Net Present Value projects. 
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